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ABSTRACT 
 
Business Cycles, Fiscal Stabilization and Vertical Foreign Direct Investment: Essays in 
International Macroeconomics. (May 2009) 
Erasmus Kristoffer Kersting, Dipl.-Volkswirt, Christian-Albrechts Universität Kiel 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Dennis W. Jansen 
 
My dissertation studies various questions falling into the broad context of 
macroeconomics and international economics. The questions have macroeconomic 
components because they are concerned with the behavior of aggregates. Specifically, 
the second and third chapters of my dissertation study the causes of fluctuations in 
aggregate macroeconomic variables and the way policy can be coordinated 
internationally to reduce these fluctuations, respectively. In addition, chapters III and IV 
address questions that fall into the realm of international economics. They are concerned 
with the optimal exchange rate regime between two countries, the consequences of 
partial exchange rate pass-through and the effect of an increase in vertical Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) by domestic firms. The framework of my analysis is given by different 
versions of general equilibrium models.  
 
The second chapter of my dissertation decomposes fluctuations in aggregate observables 
for the UK economy during the 1980s recession. Using a modern accounting procedure, 
I estimate parameters that describe the economy using annual data from 1970 to 2002. 
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Then, I simulate different versions of the model to find the distortions that are essential 
in driving the observed fluctuations. I find labor market distortions to be crucial in 
accounting for the episode, suggesting that the policies of the time were well targeted 
and effective. 
 
The third chapter of my dissertation studies policy coordination in a two-country 
framework allowing for partial pass-through. In particular, both countries are assumed to 
have monetary and fiscal stabilization instruments available. The optimal setting of these 
instruments under differing pass-through regimes is analytically derived. Fiscal policy is 
found to be used in a counter-cyclical fashion. In addition, the magnitude of fiscal 
stabilization is the largest when pass-through is partial. 
 
In the fourth chapter, I study the consequences of vertical FDI on aggregate productivity 
and welfare. The framework allows for heterogeneity across firms in two dimensions. It 
is firms that are at a disadvantage with respect to manufacturing costs that are benefiting 
most from moving their production process abroad. Overall, the ability to engage in 
vertical FDI increases productivity, lowers prices and thus increases welfare. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Macroeconomics is the study of aggregate measures that reflect the state of the whole 
economy, such as consumption, investment and output. At the same time, 
macroeconomics is concerned with policy and its impact on these aggregates, so 
additional subjects of study are given by interest rates, government expenditures and tax 
rates. Furthermore, the last few decades, which have seen a rise in so-called 
‘globalization’, have shown that a strict separation between open and closed economies 
is not appropriate anymore – so the model economies have been opened and exchange 
rates, import prices and cross-border investment have been added. 
 
This dissertation reflects the different facets of international macroeconomics. Due to the 
nature of model economies, focusing on certain aspects brings with it the decision to 
abstract from others. As a result, this work displays three very different models. 
However, there is a unifying theme. Modern macroeconomics emphasizes micro 
foundations to the extent that there is a strong consensus today to “start out” with 
rational, forward-looking agents that follow some kind of maximizing behavior. 
Classically, this includes utility maximizing consumers and profit maximizing firms. All 
three of the chapters follow this consensus as well as a general equilibrium approach.  
 
_______________________ 
This dissertation follows the style of the Journal of International Economics. 
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Beyond the fundamental commonalities, each chapter utilizes a different model to 
address the question at hand. 
 
Chapter II uses a recently developed decomposition methodology called ‘Business Cycle 
Accounting’ to study the fluctuations in aggregates in the UK economy in the 1980s. 
This episode is of special interest due to the recession and the strong labor market 
oriented policies by the Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher. The 
accounting procedure results suggest that the distortions in the labor market and their 
subsequent removal are critical in accounting for the downturn and subsequent recovery 
of output, hours worked and investment in the UK. 
 
Chapter III moves towards an open economy, two-country model since it addresses 
questions regarding international policy coordination. In particular, the optimal monetary 
and fiscal policy rules are derived. Importantly, there are no limiting assumptions 
regarding the amount of exchange rate pass-through, which describes the degree to 
which import prices fluctuate with the nominal exchange rate. Previous work often made 
limiting assumptions regarding this pass-through, and my work shows that the case of 
partial pass-through is of interest, because it results in optimal fiscal stabilization policy 
in addition to monetary policy. The chapter also finds that the mere addition of a fiscal 
stabilization instrument does not result in a fixed exchange rate regime to be optimal. 
This result is interesting in the light of recent work that has studied the extent to which 
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fiscal stabilization could replace monetary stabilization and thus prevent monetary 
unions from causing losses in welfare. 
 
Finally, the fourth chapter looks at questions related to the prevalence of vertical foreign 
direct investment. In particular, a model is used in which firms are heterogeneous across 
two dimensions, which I call manufacturing and management. It is the manufacturing 
stage of production which can be relocated in the foreign country which is expected to 
result in cost decreases. For general assumption about the nature of these cost reductions 
I proceed to show the characteristics of the firms that do and do not decide to move their 
production abroad. Furthermore, my work presents unambiguous welfare gains from 
allowing such vertical investment. While firms with low productivity are driven out of 
business, other firms can only survive through the option of moving production abroad. 
It is worth emphasizing this often neglected consequence of off-shoring. 
 
Summarizing, my dissertation presents the two most popular modeling approaches in 
modern macroeconomics, the ‘Real Business Cycle’ model in chapter II and the ‘New-
Keynesian’ model in chapter III. The questions addressed are concerned with the role of 
government policies, their effects and their optimal form. Furthermore, consequences of 
globalization are studied: the need for policy coordination is discussed in chapter III and 
finally chapter IV makes the case for vertical FDI. Instead of focusing on the perceived 
job losses at home, the focus should possibly be on the gains in welfare through added 
varieties, lower prices and higher output. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE 1980S RECESSION IN THE UK: A BUSINESS CYCLE ACCOUNTING 
PERSPECTIVE∗ 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The 1980s were a turbulent time for the UK economy. Output dropped to 10% below 
trend in the first half of the decade and only recovered by 1989. Data for employment 
and investment showed a similar pattern. This constituted the most severe recession 
since the end of the Second World War for the UK (see Figure 1). 
 
This paper uses the new Business Cycle Accounting methodology proposed by Chari, 
Kehoe and McGrattan (CKM) to examine the cyclical episode from 1979 to 1989.1 The 
procedure decomposes the movement of macroeconomic aggregates and thus allows 
conclusions with regard to which distortions may account for the fluctuations. In 
particular, four so-called ‘wedges’ that capture the influence of different distortions in 
the economy are introduced within a prototype Real Business Cycle model.  
 
Using this method allows me to proceed in three steps: First, I identify the wedges that 
drove both the recession and the subsequent recovery. Second, I can interpret my 
                                               
∗Reprinted with permission from “The 1980s Recession in the UK: A Business Cycle Accounting 
Perspective” by Erasmus K. Kersting, 2008. Review of Economic Dynamics ,11 (1), 179-191, Copyright 
[2008] by Elsevier. 
1
 Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007) 
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findings making use of what CKM call the ‘equivalence results’: These results show 
how macroeconomic models with detailed market failures can be mapped back into a 
general prototype model which just features the afore-mentioned four distinct wedges. 
For example, a model with detailed frictions in the labor market such as unions and 
monopolistic competition can be mapped into a prototype model with an appropriately 
defined ‘labor wedge’. In a third step, I look for changes in policy during this period that 
might help explain the movement in the key wedges identified earlier. 
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Figure 1. Real GDP per worker in the UK with trend line 
 
My application of Business Cycle Accounting shows the labor wedge and the efficiency 
wedge to account for most of the observed fluctuations in output, employment and 
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investment. The recovery, especially, was mainly driven by improvements in the labor 
wedge. The investment wedge played a minor role. 
 
The equivalence results thus point me in the direction of labor market distortions as the 
main factor in accounting for both downturn and recovery of the UK economy. I will 
show that there have in fact been numerous reforms that targeted the labor market 
specifically and have measurably reduced labor market distortions.  
 
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government was first elected in 1979 and then re-
elected in 1983 and 1987. The UK was perceived to be performing below its potential at 
the time, growth of output and productivity was below that of other OECD countries. 
For these reasons, the new government introduced a wide range of reforms, the main 
goals of which were to curb the power of unions and to increase work incentives by 
reforming social security and unemployment benefits. The resulting stand-offs with the 
labor unions culminating in the miners’ strike from 1984 to 1985 were well publicized 
and led to some degree of notoriety of the Thatcher regime. The accompanying increases 
in wage inequality and the persistent unemployment have led some to question the 
benefits of the reforms and to argue that they might have been taken too far.2  
 
My findings, however, suggest that the labor market reforms, including the legislation to 
reduce the role of unions in the wage negotiation process, were well placed: Distortions 
                                               
2
 Examples include but are not limited to Blanchflower and Freeman (1993), M. Gregory (1998), R.G. 
Gregory (1999), Bean and Crafts (1996). 
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in the labor market have played a large role in causing the recession, and simulations 
suggest that their removal was necessary for a recovery. Hence future researchers 
striving to build more detailed models of the UK economy for this period should focus 
on modeling the labor market distortions and the policies introduced for their removal.  
 
The BCA methodology has been (to my knowledge) applied to three countries other than 
the UK: Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan examined two recessions in the US history, the 
Great Depression and the recession in the early 1980s. They find the efficiency and the 
labor wedge to be the driving forces. However, in the US the labor distortions did not 
fluctuate as dramatically as in the UK. Furthermore, the authors found the investment 
wedge to play a small role at best. Suparna Chakraborty (2005) found that the 
investment wedge does play a role in explaining the ‘lost decade’ of the 90s in Japan. 
Using slightly different methodology, Kobayashi and Inaba (2005) also investigate the 
case of Japan. Finally, Alan Ahearne, Finn Kydland and Mark Wynne (2006) applied the 
method to Ireland, finding the investment wedge’s effect again to be negligible and most 
of the fluctuation to be captured by the efficiency and labor wedges.  
 
In the next section I will introduce the prototype model. Section three presents the 
measurement and accounting procedure. Section four describes the accounting and 
simulation results. Section five delivers some background on the cyclical episode under 
investigation and provides details on the new policies of the Thatcher government. 
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Section six combines the evidence on the effects of the new policies with my results and 
section seven concludes.  
 
 
2 The Prototype Model 
 
This section follows the standard Business Cycle literature in general and Chari, Kehoe 
and McGrattan (2007) in particular. The prototype model is a neo-classical dynamic 
growth model with four stochastic variables, henceforth called ‘wedges’: the efficiency 
wedge, which takes the form of Total Factor Productivity, the labor wedge, which looks 
like a time-varying tax on labor income, the investment wedge, which resembles a time-
varying tax on investment, and finally the government wedge, which just represents 
government spending. 
 
Consumers maximize expected utility, which depends on per capita consumption and per 
capita labor: 
∑
∞
=0
0
,
),(.max
t
ttt
t
lc
NlcUE
tt
β  
subject to the budget constraint 
tttttlttxtt Tkrlwxc ++−=++ )1()1( ττ  
and the law of motion for capital 
ttt xkk +−=+ + )1()1( 1 δλ  
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Here tk  denotes per-capita capital stock, tx  is investment, tw  the wage rate, tr  the rental 
rate on capital, ltτ  and xtτ  the tax rates on labor and investment, β  the discount factor, 
δ the depreciation rate of capital, tN  the period t population, which has a constant 
growth rate equal to λ+1 , and tT  lump-sum taxes. 
 
On the firms’ side, the profit-maximization problem is given by 
ttttt
t
ttlk
lwkrlkFA
tt
−−+ ))1(,(max
,
γ  
Here )1( γ+  is the rate of labor-augmenting technological progress which is assumed to 
be constant over time. tA  is the ‘efficiency wedge’. 
 
The equilibrium is therefore defined by the following equations: 
 
tttt ygxc =++                (1) 
))1(,( ttttt lkFAy γ+=               (2) 
lt
t
tlt
ct
lt FA
U
U )1()1( γτ +−=−               (3) 
)]1)(1([)1( 1111 ++++ +−+=+ xtkttcttxtct FAUEU τδβτ            (4) 
 
Note that notation like ctU  denotes the derivative of the utility function with respect to 
its arguments as of date t. 
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It is important to point out that the wedges represent more than just taxes: Any kind of 
distortion that leads to a discrepancy between the marginal product of labor and the 
consumer’s marginal rate of substitution between leisure and labor enters into the labor 
wedge ltτ−1 . Similarly, all the other wedges capture a host of possible distortions. 
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan make this point by working through the equivalence 
results. In different papers they present several relationships: input-financing frictions 
map into efficiency wedges, fluctuations in net exports in an open economy model map 
into the government wedge and sticky wages and monetary shocks map into labor 
wedges. The latter case is of special interest, since one way unions are modeled in the 
literature is within a sticky wage framework. One example, due to Cole and Ohanian 
(2004), introduces unions as monopolistically competitive institutions that represent 
consumers with specific labor skills and set nominal wages in advance. In particular, the 
bargaining power of the unions leads to a markup over competitive wages. This markup 
acts like a wedge between the wage rate and the marginal rate of substitution between 
labor and consumption. CKM (2004) show that this model is equivalent to the prototype 
model I described above with an appropriately defined labor wedge ltτ−1 .  
 
 
3 Measuring the Wedges 
 
As a first step, the wedges are measured from the data. I employ annual data from 1970 
to 2001 for the UK. A close examination of the first order conditions shows that given 
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data for output, the capital stock and labor input and having specified a functional form 
for the production function, it is straightforward to measure the efficiency wedge tA  
from (2). The capital stock is computed with the data on investment and the depreciation 
rate using the perpetual inventory method. Knowing investment also lets us calculate 
consumption, and after choosing a specification for the utility function in (3) I can 
compute the labor wedge )1( ltτ− . Finally, the government wedge is taken directly from 
the data and is set to equal government consumption expenditures. 
 
However, calculating the investment wedge xtτ  is not trivial. Since the Euler equation 
(4) involves expectations, the decision rules will implicitly depend on the stochastic 
process driving the wedges. Therefore a VAR(1) process is specified for 
)log,,,(log txtlttt gAs ττ= : 
 
101 ++ ++= ttt QPsPs ε               (5) 
The shock is i.i.d. and has a standard normal distribution. Q is a lower-triangular matrix. 
I use these four equations combined with the three equilibrium equations (2)-(4) to 
estimate the parameters PP ,0  and Q with a maximum likelihood procedure described in 
Anderson et al. (1996).  
 
In order to estimate the parameters of the VAR process, functional forms have to be 
specified and the model has to be calibrated. I follow Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan and 
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assume a Cobb-Douglas production function and the utility function to be of the form 
)1log(log),( lclcU −+= ψ . Furthermore, the capital share 35.=α  and the time 
allocation parameter 5.1=ψ . The depreciation rate, the discount factor and the growth 
rates of technological progress and population are chosen such that on an annualized 
basis the rate of depreciation is 5%, the rate of time preference is 3%, the population 
growth rate is 1.5% and the growth of technology is 2%. These rates are taken directly 
from the series constructed from UK data.3 
 
Throughout my calculations I assume the economy to have been at steady state in 1979, 
right before the start of the recession. In order to solve for the decision rules, the model 
is log-linearized around the steady state. By employing the method of undetermined 
coefficients, an expression is found that gives 1ˆlog +tk  as a function of the state variables 
xtlttt Ak ττ ,,log,ˆlog  and tgˆlog  (the ^ denoting deviation from steady state). 
Furthermore, expressions that link the observable variables ( ttt xyl ˆ,ˆ, ) to the state 
variables plus 1ˆ +tk  can also be found. 
 
Given these equations, the model is written in State Space Form: 
 
11 ++ += ttt CBXX ε                (6) 
ttt DXY ω+=                 (7) 
                                               
3see data appendix for details 
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with ]'1,ˆlog,,,log,ˆ[log txtltttt gAkX ττ=  and ]ˆlog,log,ˆlog,ˆ[log ttttt glxyY =  
 
The matrix B contains the coefficients linking 1ˆ +tk  to tX  and the matrix P from the 
VAR(1) process in (5). D on the other hand holds all the coefficients that link the 
observables in tY  to the states in tX . 
 
In order to arrive at the likelihood function that is to be maximized, the Kalman filter is 
used. The filter generates a series of one-step-ahead predictions which are then 
compared to the actual data. The difference enters the likelihood function: small 
deviations lead to high values of the likelihood function. 
 
Once the estimates are found, the stochastic process the agents use to form their 
expectations about the future is known. All of the wedges can now be measured. By 
construction, all of the wedges taken together make up all of the fluctuations in the 
observable series. However, I can now simulate the model using different scenarios in 
which I allow only some of the wedges to vary, setting the others to their steady state 
value. This is what Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan call ‘decomposition’. They emphasize 
that this exercise is crucial: while other authors have measured the wedges and graphed 
them, only this simulation using the previously estimated decision rules allows a 
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judgment regarding which distortions are mainly responsible for the dramatic 
fluctuations in output, investment and labor4.  
 
The next section presents the results of the accounting and simulation exercises. Since 
the results encourage a closer look at the changes in the labor market, I then go on to 
examine the recession of 1980 in the UK in more detail and provide an overview of the 
main reforms introduced by the Conservative government.  
 
 
4 Accounting and Simulation Results 
 
Figure 2 shows aggregate data for the UK. Note that I am setting 1979 to be the base 
year, assuming a linear trend of annual growth of 2% which is taken from data leading 
up to 1979. In this and the following figures, all of the series are normalized to equal 1 in 
1979. Output dropped 10% below trend within two years. Investment and employment 
also started to decline after 1979. Investment is at 29% below trend at 1981, while labor 
supply drops more gradually to 10% below trend by 1983. The recovery of output 
doesn’t start until 1984 and it takes until 1989 for output to be back at its trend level. 
Investment recovery is somewhat more rapid. 
 
                                               
4
 Note that I use the “CKM methodology” in these simulations. In recent work, Chari, Kehoe and 
McGrattan (2007) show that this methodology is consistent with their theoretical equivalence results, 
whereas an earlier used methodology is not. See Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007) for more details. 
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The drop in output to 10% below trend is of identical magnitude as the one in the 
corresponding US data – however, in the US output was back to just 1% below trend by 
1985. A comparison with data from Ireland and continental Europe shows that the 
decline in output during the early 1980s relative to trend was severe in Ireland, as well, 
while it was of a lesser magnitude in France, Germany and Italy (see Figure 3 and the 
discussion in section six). 
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Figure 2. UK output, labor supply, investment and government expenditures 
 
Figure 4 shows the development of the wedges over the period 1979 - 1989. Especially 
notable are two things: the labor wedge )1( lτ−  is dropping most sharply, but it also 
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recovers completely by 1989. On the other hand, the investment wedge moves into the 
‘wrong’ direction. This finding corresponds to a result obtained by Chari, Kehoe and 
McGrattan, who find the investment wedge 





+ xτ1
1
 for the US economy during the 
recession in the 1980s also to slightly increase. Since the investment wedge doesn’t 
follow the recession and recovery pattern, I conclude that the distortions represented by 
the investment wedge are not the crucial ones behind this cyclical episode, just as in the 
case of the US economy during the Great Depression and the recession from 1980 to 
1982. Note that this is not to say that the investment wedge did not matter at all. It 
clearly played an alleviating role, preventing an even stronger recession. 
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Figure 3. Real GDP per worker in the UK, continental Europe and Ireland (1979 = 1) 
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Figure 4. Output and measured wedges 
 
The labor wedge, on the other hand, does decline and recover roughly in step with 
output. Because of this significance, it is interesting to examine just what distortions this 
labor wedge captures. One way to address this question is to compare the measured 
values of lτ  with data on effective marginal tax rates in the UK. This data has been 
made available by Martinez-Mongay (2000), who adopted methodology developed by 
Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994). Martinez-Mongay created time series of effective tax 
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rates in several countries for the European Commission. For my calculations I use data 
on the tax rate on labor and on consumption for the UK.5 
 
Figure 5 shows the estimated wedge lτ  from the model and the effective tax rate 
calculated from the data set by Martinez-Mongay.6 The two series have a correlation 
coefficient of 0.64 and are generally moving together. However, the labor wedge 
estimated by the model is more volatile. So while the tax rates explain much of the 
movement of the labor wedge, there seem to be additional unobserved components. 
Ahearne, Kydland and Wynne (2006) find a much stronger correlation between their 
estimate of the labor wedge and effective marginal tax rates for Ireland than I did for the 
UK. This suggests that non-tax related labor market distortions (possibly due to unions 
or the unemployment benefit system) have been more prominent in the UK than in 
Ireland. 
                                               
5
 His series CETR and LETR. This comparison follows along the lines of Ahearne, Kydland and Wynne 
(2006). 
6
 Note that the series depicted is lτ  (as opposed to lτ−1 ), so upward motion here corresponds to 
increasing distortions. 
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Figure 5. Estimated labor wedge and intratemporal tax wedge 
  
The efficiency wedge drops sharply in the first two years and then stays roughly level. 
After 1986 it declines further, leading to the suspicion that the recovery of output might 
have been mainly driven by a different wedge. 
 
As a next step, I simulate various models in order to isolate the effects of each wedge on 
the output series. Figure 6 shows the predictions of the models in which only one wedge 
is free to vary. The model with just the labor wedge by itself7 replicates the recession 
pattern, even though the decline in output doesn’t start until 1980 and the drop is too 
                                               
7
 What is referred to as the ‘labor wedge alone economy’ in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007). 
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severe. The investment wedge drives output up, which is not surprising given the 
previous section’s observations.  
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Figure 6. Output according to data and models with just one wedge 
 
Figure 7 displays models with more than one wedge. The goal is to identify the 
distortions that generate output predictions that are close to the observed data. As 
already discussed above, two wedges alone cannot account for all of the observed 
movement by definition. However, leaving out the investment and the government 
wedges results in an output series that is reasonably close to the observed data. Future 
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research that models the UK economy of the 1980s should therefore focus on the labor 
and efficiency wedge.  
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Figure 7. Output according to data and model with several wedges 
 
In order to underline the importance of the labor wedge, I also simulate a model where 
all wedges were free to vary except for the labor wedge. The result is striking: The 
pattern of the recession is not recognizable, showing that the labor wedge was indeed the 
driving force during that economic period.  
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Figures 8 and 9 depict the development of labor supply. Overall, the picture is similar to 
the one for output (the government wedge has been omitted for more clarity). However, 
employment stays around 10% below trend until 1986 and the efficiency wedge plays 
less of a role in determining fluctuations in labor supply. The ‘action’ seems to stem 
from the labor and investment wedges, the former being the culprit for the recession but 
also responsible for the recovery. The investment wedge is alleviating the drop, so that 
actual labor supply does not fall as sharply as a model with only labor distortions would 
have predicted. Again it is not easy to see which wedges can be safely ignored when 
trying to replicate the development of the observable behavior of the aggregates (Figure 
9) – certain is that the labor wedge plays the largest part.  
 
The results suggest that models of the UK economy during this episode should focus on 
changes to the labor wedge. The next section will show that there were numerous new 
policies which are known to have impacted that wedge and are thus likely to have 
contributed to the recovery of the UK economy. 
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Figure 8. Labor supply according to data and models with one wedge 
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Figure 9. Labor from data and model with labor and efficiency wedge 
 
 
5 The Reforms by the Thatcher Government 
 
To understand the agenda of the Conservative government, it is helpful to briefly recall 
the situation the UK found itself in at the beginning of Margaret Thatcher’s tenure in 
1979. Relative post-war economic performance in the UK up to 1980 had been feeble: 
annual productivity and GDP per capita growth rates had consistently been lower in the 
UK than the median of a sample of 12 OECD countries.8 Table 1 shows a comparison 
with Germany, France and Italy, which are often used as direct benchmarks. 
                                               
8
 See Bean and Crafts Table 6.1, p.133. 
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Furthermore it shows the numbers for Ireland, which has been hit similarly hard by the 
recession in the early 1980s but has not introduced radical labor market reforms and 
therefore presents an interesting case for comparison. 
 
Table 1. Growth of real output per working population (% per year) 
 
Figure 3 shows GDP per working population for the UK, continental Europe and Ireland. 
The UK has been growing at a lower rate during the 1970s and output dropped more 
sharply during the 1980s recession than in the other countries.  However, the second half 
of the 1980s was marked by a high level of growth, which was absent in the other 
countries.   
 
In 1979, it was generally distortions in the labor market that were blamed for the poor 
performance of the UK economy. Patrick Minford wrote in 1983 that there are “… major 
distortions in the UK labor market which prevent real wages and productivity from 
adjusting naturally to shifts in technology, demand, and industrial structure, and 
relocating those freed from one sector into other sectors”. (p.2) He identifies these two 
distortions to be the operation of the unemployment benefit system and the power of the 
unions to raise wages relative to non-union wages. New legislation by the Conservative 
 UK Ireland France Italy Germany 
1950-59 2.2 2.4 4.1 5.5 n/a 
1960-69 2.5 4.6 4.8 5.8 n/a 
1970-79 1.9 3.6 2.6 3 2.2 
1980-89 1.9 1.4 2.1 1.6 1.1 
1990-99 1.7 5.2 1.1 1 1.9 
2000-03 2.2 4.3 1.6 1.3 1.0 
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government was aimed primarily at the removal of these distortions: Blanchflower and 
Freeman (1993) identify the main goals to have been to 1) weaken the power of unions, 
2) increase incentives to work by reforming unemployment and other benefits, 3) reduce 
the influence of government on market outcomes and 4) expand self-employment. 
 
Table 2 shows the most important reforms, following Blanchflower and Freeman’s 
categorization. Union legislation such as the Employment Acts of 1980, 1982 and 1988 
and the Trade Union Act of 1984 were implemented to change the landscape of 
industrial relations in the UK. The four acts targeted all aspects of union organization: 
they regulated the way unions had to vote for industrial action before strikes, increased 
the compensation of individuals that were dismissed because of closed shops and 
prohibited contractual arrangements ensuring that contracts go only to employers with 
recognized trade unions, to name only a few examples.  
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Table 2. Main reforms by the Thatcher government 
1) Reduce Union Power 
a) Employment Act of 1980 abolishes statutory recognition procedures; extends grounds to refuse to join a 
union; limits picketing. 
b) Employment Act of 1982 prohibits actions that force contracts with union employers; weakens closed 
shop (“closed shop” means obligatory union membership within a firm); removes some union immunities. 
c) Trade Union Act of 1984 weakens union immunities; requires pre-strike ballots; strengthens employer 
power to get injunctions. 
d) Employment Act of 1988 removes further union immunities; extends individual rights to work against a 
union 
2) Change Welfare State to Increase Work Incentives 
a) Diverse acts that reduce replacement ratio for unemployment benefits; eliminate benefits for young 
people 
b) Restart Program introduced in 1986 required all unemployed to be interviewed about job search every 
six months. 
c) Many administrative changes to make it more difficult to obtain benefits. 
d) Diverse acts that maintain real value of other non-work benefits but lower the value relative to wages 
3) Reduce Governmental Role in Market 
a) Privatize pensions 
b) Abolish wages councils 
c) Lower tax rates 
d) Reduce government employment 
e) Privatization 
4) Enhance self-employment and skills 
a) Enterprise Allowance Scheme 
b) New training initiatives; Youth Training Scheme; Community Programme; Employment Training 
Programme 
The consequences of this legislation have been the subject of many studies and there is 
some consensus regarding their direct effects. The acts led to a steady decline in union 
density throughout the 1980s (Freeman and Pelletier (1990), Blanchflower and Freeman 
(1993), Gregory (1998)) and a change in the wage negotiation process (Millward et. al 
1992). Work by Freeman, Pelletier and Blanchflower reports union density in the UK to 
have increased from 45% to just below 55% between 1970 and 1979, and then to have 
continually dropped reaching 40% by 1990.  At the same time, the absence of similar 
reforms in Ireland resulted in steady union density of around 50% between 1980 and 
1985 (see Freeman and Pelletier (1990), Fig. 1, p. 143 and Blanchflower and Freeman 
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(1993), Fig. 1a, p. 31). Gregory (1998) reports slightly different numbers, which is due 
to the various ways union density is measured. Table 3 shows annual numbers for union 
membership and density from 1979 to 1996. 
 
Table 3. Union membership and density rates 
Year Union membership 
(millions) 
Union density of 
employment (in %) 
1979 11.7 50.0 
1980 11.4 48.7 
1981 10.7 48.0 
1982 10.2 47.0 
1983 9.9 46.1 
1984 9.7 45.0 
1985 9.5 43.8 
1986 9.3 42.6 
1987 9.3 42.2 
1988 9.2 40.5 
1989 9.0 39.0 
1990 8.9 38.1 
1991 8.6 37.5 
1992 8.0 35.8 
1993 7.8 35.1 
1994 7.6 33.6 
1995 7.3 32.1 
1996 7.2 31.3 
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With union density dropping throughout the duration of the Thatcher administration, the 
effects on collective bargaining are of immediate interest. Millward et al. report the 
results of three surveys on the wage determination process conducted in 1980, 1984 and 
1990. They find that trade unions’ role in jointly determining rates of pay has 
substantially declined over the decade. More interestingly, this decline was not linear but 
rather “concentrated in the period since 1984” (p. 102). Gregory (1998) reports a decline 
in the share of workers in the UK that were covered by a collective wage agreement 
from 70% in 1980 to 47% in 1990. 
 
Finally, the reason for the improvements in the investment wedge over the observed 
period are likely to be connected to the various tax cuts under the Thatcher government. 
Before 1979, the high rates of income tax ranged from 40% to 83%, and there was an 
investment income surcharge of 15% for those with very high investment income. In 
consecutive steps, the Conservative government reduced the tax rates; in 1979 the basic 
rate of income tax was reduced from 33 to 30% and the top rate to 60%. The starting rate 
and the investment income surcharge were abolished in 1980 and 1984, respectively. In 
1988, the whole tax system has been simplified to a three-tier system with rates 0, 25% 
and 40%. 95% of all taxpayers were covered by the middle range.9 
 
Having established UK’s economic situation relative to other countries, the goals of the 
reform program of the Thatcher administration and the measurable impact the new 
                                               
9
 See Adam and Shaw (2003) for more details. 
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legislation had on the labor market, I can now combine the evidence with my accounting 
results.  
 
 
6 The 1980s Recession in the UK 
 
The episode under investigation was characterized by a major downturn and the 
recovery period. It is helpful to separate the two when comparing the accounting results 
for several countries, since many countries experienced the downturn in the early 1980s 
whereas the strong economic performance by the UK during the recovery was unique. 
Comparing my results to those from Ireland and the US, I find that the global downturn 
of 1980 was caused by distortions represented by the efficiency and labor wedges across 
all three countries.10 However, the declines in the labor wedges of the UK and Ireland 
are of a far larger magnitude than the corresponding ones for the US. This is potentially 
due to the differences in the labor market structure, with unions playing a large role in 
the UK and Ireland, as Freeman and Pelletier (1990) show. Other distortions mentioned 
by Minford like the unemployment benefit system could also have played a part. The 
drop in the efficiency wedge could be a consequence of the second oil price shock 
1979/1980, which would explain the fact that it occurred in all three of the 
aforementioned countries. 
  
                                               
10
 Compare Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007), Fig. 8 and Ahearne, Kydland and Wynne (2006) Fig. 3  
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The UK was the only country to introduce far-reaching labor market reforms. As 
discussed above, the reforms led to a gradual weakening of unions with a steady decline 
in union density as the measurable result. Collective bargaining was slowly replaced by 
plant- or employee-level negotiations with much of the changes occurring after 1984. 
This corresponds well to the labor wedge series I estimated, which started its recovery 
around 1984 and caused the UK economy to return to trend by the end of the decade, 
outperforming other European economies in the process. In Ireland, no such reforms 
were introduced and the labor wedge levels off around 1985 after having increased in the 
early 1980s. The absence of drastic labor market reforms in Ireland resulted in a constant 
labor wedge, as well as a constant union density. However, in the UK the reforms caused 
a decline in both union density and the measured labor wedge.  
 
My findings suggest that the reforms introduced by the Conservative government 
succeeded in helping the UK economy recover from the recession of 1980/1981. 
Furthermore, the rapid improvements in the labor wedge caused the UK to outperform 
the three large countries of continental Europe and Ireland. 
 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
Applying Business Cycle Accounting methodology to UK data for the cyclical episode 
between the years 1979 and 1989 allows me to single out the distortions that account for 
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most of the fluctuation. I find the labor wedge to drive a large part of observed 
fluctuations in output, employment and investment in the UK during the 1980s. In 
addition, several simulations show that the recovery in the labor wedge was necessary 
for the recovery in output and labor supply that started in 1984. Guided by this result, I 
examine evidence on the labor market reforms undertaken by the Conservative 
government during this period. 
 
The Thatcher policies were aimed at removing frictions in the labor market through 
measures such as reducing the power of the unions, raising the incentives to find work 
and move out of unemployment and reducing the governmental role in markets. Previous 
studies have found the policies to be effective as measured by a reduction in union 
density, an increase in the amount of self-employed workers and decline in the 
importance of collective bargaining in the wage determination process. Thus the policies 
had a direct effect on the labor market. My work shows that distortions in the labor 
market truly were responsible for the severity of the recession in the 1980s and that their 
removal was an important factor in the recovery of the UK economy by 1989. This 
suggests that the policies were well targeted and overall successful in speeding up the 
recovery. 
 
Further research on this particular episode of the UK economy should focus on ways to 
model explicitly the frictions in the labor market caused by a high degree of unionization 
in order to attempt to identify more clearly the benefits of the new policies. 
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CHAPTER III 
POLICY COORDINATION, FISCAL STABILIZATION AND ENDOGENOUS 
UNIONS 
 
1 Introduction 
 
One prominent role of monetary policy is macroeconomic stabilization. Focusing on this 
aspect, it is somewhat of a mystery why countries would ever choose to give up 
sovereign control over their monetary policy by forming a currency union. In his famous 
pioneering work, Mundell (1961) outlines the costs and benefits of forming a common 
currency area. The benefit of having numerous areas each with their own currency arises 
from an increased potential for stabilization: In the case of economic shocks that are 
specific to certain regions, appreciation or depreciation takes the place of inflation or 
unemployment, respectively. As a consequence, the optimal currency area is not the 
world, but rather regions displaying factor mobility. 
 
Recent contributions to international macroeconomics have provided more details on the 
exact nature of the stabilization trade-off facing a monetary policy maker in an open 
economy. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001) show that optimal policy in an open economy 
may still be purely inward-looking, i.e. focus solely on domestic inflation. The exchange 
rate is optimally allowed to float. Devereux and Engel (2003), on the other hand, show 
that a fixed exchange rate is another possible equilibrium outcome when assumptions 
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about the pricing behavior by firms are changed, in particular regarding the extent of 
exchange rate pass-through on prices charged in export markets. In general, it is difficult 
to reconcile the New-Keynesian model, which is usually the model of choice in the 
analysis of monetary policy in international macroeconomics, with the decision by 
sovereign countries to form a monetary union. 
 
The present chapter takes up this issue and examines whether adding a fiscal 
stabilization instrument to the policy maker's arsenal will change the conclusion that 
independent monetary policy - and thus a flexible exchange rate - is essential for 
stabilization. Since it has been shown that the degree of pass-through plays a crucial role 
in determining the optimal exchange rate policy, I follow Sutherland (2005) and Corsetti 
and Pesenti (2005) in allowing for a general elasticity of pass-through that includes the 
two most widely studied scenarios of Producer Currency Pricing (PCP) and Local 
Currency Pricing (LCP) as special cases.11    I find that introducing a fiscal stabilization 
instrument does not eliminate the need for country-specific monetary policy as long as 
there are country-specific shocks. The fiscal instrument is found to play an active role 
for values of pass-through different from the cases of PCP and LCP, but it is not used to 
reduce fluctuations in the exchange rate, let alone stabilize it completely. On the 
contrary, exchange rate fluctuations rise slightly with the introduction of the additional 
instrument. The welfare gains from using the fiscal instrument are realized by further 
reducing fluctuations in consumption. 
                                               
11
 There is empirical evidence for the relevance of non-perfect pass-through (see Engel and Rogers (1996) 
and Goldberg and Knetter (1997)). 
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There are numerous papers that have studied the question of optimal monetary policy in 
a monetary union. The emergence of the European Monetary Union (EMU) has 
increased the demand for careful analysis of the consequences of a centralization of 
monetary policy in recent years. In a working paper, Corsetti (2006) takes up the 
classical topic of optimal currency areas and reviews the question using a modern open-
macro model with nominal rigidities. He does not include fiscal policy in his analysis, 
focusing instead on the monetary side of the question. In particular, he presents a 
number of special cases in which joining a monetary union does not result in a loss of 
welfare for two countries. 
 
With regard to recent papers on monetary unions, Corsetti's work presents an exception 
to the rule in the sense that he examines the optimality of forming the union itself. Other 
recent contributions on monetary union-related questions such as Benigno (2004) and 
Ferrera (2007) take the existence of the monetary union as given and ask questions that 
arise once the union is in place. While this may be of practical interest given the 
existence of the EMU, this paper, like Corsetti's, aims at studying the question which is 
logically prior to questions concerned with the optimal policy in a monetary union: Is it 
ever optimal to coordinate policies with other countries to the extent of forming a union? 
In addition, would countries benefit just as much from centralizing fiscal policy - or 
maybe more? Is there a connection between the two; is a monetary union necessary for 
there to be gains from a fiscal union? 
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In addressing these questions, this paper touches on several strands of the literature. 
First, it contributes to the diverse literature examining policy and coordination problems 
in a setting with coexisting centralized and regional policy makers: In recent work, 
Cooper and Kempf (2004) examine the extent to which fiscal policy can overturn the 
result that a monetary union is never optimal unless the regional shocks are highly 
correlated. Using an overlapping generations framework, they model the two ingredients 
of the Mundellian trade-off using unemployment insurance for the 'stabilization' part and 
agent-specific taste shocks to introduce gains from reducing the number of currencies. 
Their results differ from mine since I do not find a monetary union with fiscal policy 
remaining under the individual countries' control to be superior to a Nash equilibrium 
with two independent countries. 
 
While my questions are similar to those asked by Cooper and Kempf, the method of this 
paper follows the New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) literature. 
Stabilization within this framework refers to closing gaps between the allocation that is 
obtained under fixed prices and the flex-price equilibrium. This rapidly growing 
literature on open-economy macroeconomics is usually credited to the pioneering work 
by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996). However, the treatment of fiscal policy in these 
models is considerably less developed and standardized than that of monetary policy. In 
general, fiscal policy is often introduced in the form of exogenous government 
expenditure which uses up goods, but fulfills no other role. In this context, government 
shocks are considered exogenous and introduced alongside with technology or other 
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shocks. Examples of this approach include the benchmark model in Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1996, Ch. 10). Alternatively, Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) introduce fiscal policy via 
government expenditures which enter the consumer's utility function. 
 
More recently, Lombardo and Sutherland (2004) study monetary and fiscal policies in a 
two-country model. They model fiscal policy in terms of government expenditure, which 
enters consumers' utility. Among one consequence of this modeling choice is that fiscal 
and monetary policy are set independently of each other, which is not the case in my 
design. Lastly, they focus exclusively on the case of producer currency pricing. Coutinho 
(2008) addresses questions that are also similar to those I ask. He expands the 
framework used by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) by introducing sales taxes on firms. 
However, he considers only the case of perfect pass-through as well, which, as I show 
below, is a somewhat special case. My results vary from his due to a difference in 
modeling choices and, more importantly, the type of tax considered. 
 
In this model, I consider fiscal policy as a potential stabilization instrument. There are 
well-documented practical problems that arise if government expenditure is meant to 
fulfill stabilizing roles, including concern about both the inside and the outside lag. The 
inside lag refers to the time between recognizing the need to act and eventually passing 
the appropriate legislation. The outside lag refers to the time that it takes for this 
legislation to have a measurable effect on the economy. These observations led Alan 
Blinder (2004) to conclude "If fiscal policy is to be used for stabilization purposes, taxes 
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(and transfers) are probably the instrument of choice." I therefore choose to insert 
nominal income taxes in the model, which turns out to provide a very direct way in 
which the government can influence prices, labor supply and output. 
 
There are some additional basic modeling decisions within the NOEM framework which 
are known to have important consequences. First, as mentioned above, the amount of 
pass-through from a change in the exchange rate to the import prices faced by customers 
is a crucial element. Choosing not to focus only on LCP and PCP, I introduce the pass-
through elasticity as a parameter.12 In this way, I examine the robustness of my results 
with respect to specific assumptions regarding the pass-through. 
 
Second, the choice to keep the model tractable necessitates some further assumptions. 
The resulting model therefore shares features with those used by Corsetti and Pesenti 
(2001, 2005), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) and Devereux and Engel (2003). In order to 
focus on the real consequences of policy interaction, I make the assumptions required to 
render the asset market irrelevant, in the sense that agents opt not to hold bonds in 
equilibrium. In addition, I assume unity elasticity of substitution. Benigno and Benigno 
(2003) have shown that this assumption in particular eliminates some scope for 
interdependence between the two countries' policy choices. It also results in the flex 
price allocation being the best possible outcome, which is not generally the case under 
less specific assumptions. However, making this assumption results in tractability of the 
                                               
12
 Ideally, one would want to model firms to endogenously choose the elasticity of pass-through on their 
prices, as Corsetti and Pesenti (2002) do. This is beyond the scope of this paper, however. 
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model. In addition, my framework nonetheless generates several interaction effects 
between the countries' policy choices. 
 
The way fiscal policy is introduced in this model leaves the policy maker with two fiscal 
decisions. One concerns the average, or long-term, level of the labor tax, which has 
welfare implications in itself. The second decision concerns the determination of short-
term deviations from the long-term rate, which are timed so as to be able to respond to 
contemporary shocks. The long-term level of the tax rate also influences the flex-price 
solution of the model, so it drops out of the examination of welfare relative to the flex-
price case. However, I show that in a Nash equilibrium, countries choose not to 
subsidize labor enough, because they do not take the resulting increase in foreign 
consumption into account. It is in that sense that fiscal policy coordination leads to gains 
in welfare. 
 
Policy makers use the short-term fiscal stabilization instrument to reduce CPI 
fluctuations. This is achieved by choosing a policy rule for the innovation to the labor 
tax that responds to relative productivity shocks. This in turn 'diversifies' the impact of 
exogenous shocks on marginal costs, bringing down consumption volatility. The use of 
the fiscal instrument generates the highest gains in welfare relative to the case without 
the second instrument at medium levels of pass-through. This finding highlights the 
importance of considering deviations from the special cases that most of the previous 
literature has focused on. I further show that the way fiscal policy reduces CPI volatility 
 40 
is similar to the effects of monetary policy coordination in a world without fiscal 
instruments. In that sense, the fiscal instruments can be regarded as a substitute to 
monetary coordination. 
 
The introduction of fiscal stabilization instruments via labor income taxes results in 
lower volatility in consumption and higher welfare. Fiscal instruments optimally react to 
relative productivity shocks, which gives them a distinctly different role from monetary 
policy. For that reason, the addition of fiscal stabilization does not result in a more stable 
exchange rate and is thus not a step towards monetary union. The flex-price allocation 
can still only be reached in the case of perfect pass-through. The first-best flex-price 
allocation can be achieved only if long-term fiscal policy is set in a coordinated fashion. 
Regarding stabilization, my results do not overturn Mundell's concerns - the best 
possible solution is still to leave each country full control of its own policy instruments. 
 
My general treatment of the exchange rate pass-through allows the formulation of 
optimal policy as a function of pass-through. This is highly desirable in light of recent 
papers that show that partial pass-through is empirically most relevant, for example 
Campa and Goldberg (2005). The results of the model consequently suggest how 
monetary and fiscal policy should change as the policy maker faces a changing exchange 
rate transmission environment. In particular, a decline in the pass-through should be met 
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with an increasing weight on foreign productivity shocks in the domestic monetary 
policy function in addition to more active fiscal policy.13 
 
Section two will introduce the model. Sections three and four provide its solution under 
the assumption of flexible prices and fixed prices, respectively. Section five derives the 
two countries' objective function. Section six analyzes optimal monetary and fiscal 
policy rules in a Nash equilibrium. Sections seven and eight study the cases of 
cooperation and asymmetric countries and section nine concludes. 
 
 
2 The Model 
 
2.1 The Consumer Side and Consumption Indices 
 
The model follows Devereux and Engel (2003), with the addition of income taxes and 
the option to allow for levels of pass-through that lie between the two extremes of PCP 
on one hand and LCP on the other. There are two countries, each populated by a 
continuum of agents with unit mass. Agents in the home country are indexed by j. 
Variables in the foreign country are denoted with an (*), so foreign agents are indexed 
by j*. 
 
                                               
13
 Recently, studies have presented empirical evidence for a decline in pass-through in industrialized 
countries in recent years. See Campa and Goldberg (2002) or Gagnon and Ihrig (2004). 
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Home agent's (j) lifetime expected utility is given by:14 
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There is a continuum of varieties of the final good, with each variety being produced by 
a specific monopolistic firm. The continuum is assumed to have unit mass. All goods are 
traded. Home produced goods are indexed by h and foreign produced goods are indexed 
by f. Agents maximize lifetime utility taking prices and wages as given. This results in 
consumption indexes for the two kinds of goods given by 
1 11
, 0
( ) ( , )H t tC j C h j dh
λ
λ λ
λ
−
− 
=  
 
∫  
and 
1 11
, 0
( ) ( , )F t tC j C f j df
λ
λ λ
λ
−
− 
=  
 
∫  
λ represents the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of the home good 
and the foreign good. The elasticity of substitution between varieties is assumed to be 
strictly greater than the elasticity of substitution between the bundles of foreign and 
domestically produced goods, which in turn is unity. As a result, the home and foreign 
representative agent consumption basket is in the familiar Cobb-Douglas form: 
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14
 The assumption of log utility from consumption is not necessary for tractability. However, the loss of 
generality is minimal and the gain due to clarity of exposition considerable. For details regarding the 
derivations with a more general CRRA utility see Devereux and Engel (2003). Similarly, disutility from 
work is chosen to be linear for simplicity. 
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n can be interpreted as a measure of the size of the economy, since it represents the 
prevalence of the home country's products in both countries' consumption baskets. It is 
not to be confused with a source for home bias, since it represents the weight for 
domestic goods in both baskets - so n > (1/2) results in both countries spending more 
than half of their total nominal expenditure on goods from the home country. As is well 
known, the assumption of unit elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic 
consumption bundles generates the result that the asset market is redundant, in the sense 
that it is not required for risk sharing across countries. Assuming an initially balanced 
current account, no country will be a net lender or borrower at the end of any period. 
 
Solving the expenditure minimization problem results in the following home price 
indexes: 
1
1 11
, 0
( )H t tP p h dh λλ −− =   ∫   and  
1
1 11
, 0
( )F t tP p f df λλ −− =   ∫  
*
HP  and 
*
FP  are defined accordingly. 
 
In addition, the overall CPI for the home and the foreign country are given by 
1
, ,
n n
t H t F tP P P
−
=   and  ( ) ( )1* * *, ,n nt H t F tP P P −=  
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2.2 Technology and Resource Constraints 
 
Output is linear in labor. A productivity factor tθ  represents the amount of output 
produced by one period of labor. 
( ) ( )t t tY h l hθ=  
tθ  and *tθ  reflect labor productivity in the home and the foreign country, respectively. 
They are governed by the following processes: 
1ln lnt t tuθ θ −= +  
* * *
1ln lnt t tuθ θ −= +  
tu  and 
*
tu  are assumed to be i.i.d. normally distributed random variables with zero mean. 
 
The resource constraint for any domestic variety h is given by 
1 1
* * *
0 0
( ) ( , ) ( , )t t tY h C h j dj C h j dj≤ +∫ ∫  
The nominal marginal cost is determined only be the common wage rate tW  and labor 
productivity: 
( ) tt t
t
WMC h MC
θ
= =  
A home firm’s nominal profits tΠ  are given by 
1 1
* * * *
0 0
( ( ) ) ( , ) ( ( ) ) ( , )t t t t t t t tp h MC C h j dj S p h MC C h j djΠ = − + −∫ ∫          (9) 
Finally, there is a resource constraint for labor: 
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1 1
0 0
( ) ( )t tl j dj l h dh≤∫ ∫  
This condition simply states that the aggregate amount of labor supplied by all 
individuals in the home country needs to be equal or greater than the aggregate amount 
of labor demanded by all of the domestic firms.  
 
2.3 Budget Constraints and Consumer Optimization 
 
Consumers hold money balances tM  and bonds denoted in the domestic currency tB  
and bonds denoted in the foreign currency *tB . Their income consists of interest receipts 
on the bonds, money carried over from last period, wages on labor and profits from the 
firms. The uses consist of holding assets to carry over to the next period, consumption, 
and lump-sum taxes payable to the government denoted by tΘ . Proportional nominal 
taxes tτ  have to be paid on labor income. 
* * *
1 1 1
1
0
1 1
0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )
t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t
t t t t
M j B j S B j M j i B j i B j
W l j j h dh
p h C h j dh p f C f j df
τ
+ + −+ + ≤ + + + +
+ − − Θ + Π
− −
∫
∫ ∫
      (10) 
The timing convention is taken from Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), or Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1996, ch.10): ( )tM j  denotes agent j’s nominal balances accumulated during period t 
and carried over into period t+1. However, ( )tB j  and *( )tB j  denote agent j’s bonds 
accumulated during period t-1 and carried over into period t. 
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The consumers maximize (8) subject to (10) with respect to consumption, labor effort, 
real money balances and bond holdings. They take wages and prices as given. The 
optimality conditions can be used to find expressions for the demanded quantities of 
home and foreign goods: 
,
,
( )( , ) ( )tt H t
H t
p hC h j C j
P
λ−
 
=  
  
 
,
,
( )( , ) ( )tt F t
F t
p fC f j C j
P
λ−
 
=  
  
 
The Cobb-Douglas aggregation ensures that spending on home and foreign goods is a 
constant fraction of overall spending given by n and 1-n, respectively: 
, , , ,
1 1( ) ( ) ( )
1t t H t H t F t F t
PC j P C j P C j
n n
= =
−
 
The government budget constraint is given by 
1 1 1
10 0 0
( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) 0t t t t t tM j M j dj j dj W l j djτ−− + Θ + ≥∫ ∫ ∫  
tM  denotes the money supply set by the monetary authority. The rules for monetary and 
fiscal policy will be discussed in more detail below. Clearly, any kind of fiscal and 
monetary policy can be financed by the government by choosing the appropriate transfer 
tΘ . Government revenue from taxation plays no further role. Parallel to seigniorage 
revenue, which is commonly assumed to be redistributed to the consumers in a lump-
sum fashion, income taxes do nothing beyond providing the fiscal policy maker with a 
policy instrument. This assumption of fiscal policy operating through the 'revenue side' 
is common in the optimal taxation literature, as noted by Coutinho (2008). 
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Clearly, the availability of lump-sum transfers to the government eliminates the 
possibility of addressing questions concerning different effects of expansionary fiscal 
policy depending on the source of financing the government chooses. Ganelli (2005) 
combines a New Open Economy Macroeconomics framework with an overlapping 
generations setup to generate an environment in which Ricardian Equivalence is violated 
and different financing choices by the fiscal authority have different effects on the 
economy. However, his work falls into the category of papers that introduce fiscal policy 
as an additional shock to the economy rather than a potential stabilization instrument. 
Since the stabilization interaction between fiscal and monetary policy is at the core of 
this paper, the government is assumed to have lump-sum transfers at its disposal. 
 
2.4 Price Setting by Domestic Firms 
 
Firms set their prices one period in advance, and the assumption of monopolistic 
competition results in a markup over marginal cost. However, since there is a continuum 
of varieties, each producer is too small to have an impact on the aggregate price indices 
HP  and FP . 
 
Firms maximize the utility of their owners, resulting in next period’s profits being 
discounted using a subjective discount factor. More formally, firms maximize 
1 1,t t t tE Q− − Π , where tΠ  is given by (9) and 1,t tQ −  is the stochastic discount rate 
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1,
1 1
t t
t t
t t
PCQ
P C
β
−
− −
≡ . The optimal price chosen by domestic firms for the domestic market 
is given by 
1 1, , ,
1 1, , ,
( )
( )
1 ( )
t t t t H t H t t
t
t t t t H t H t
E Q p h P C MC
p h
E Q p h P C
λ λ
λ λ
λ
λ
−
− −
−
− −
  
=
−   
         (11) 
Using the conditions 
, , , ,
1 1( ) ( ) ( )
1t t H t H t F t F t
PC j P C j P C j
n n
= =
−
 
along with 
, 1
1 1
( )( ) ( )
t t
t t
t t
PC jQ j
P C jβ+ + +
≡  
and 
, 1 , 1( )t t t tQ j Q+ +=  
we can write (11) as 
[ ]
, 1( ) 1t H t t tp h P E MC
λ
λ −= = −  
The pricing in the export market is more complicated, since it depends on the degree of 
pass-through of the exchange rate on export prices. Firms are assumed to be able to 
price-discriminate between home and foreign markets. As in Sutherland (2005), there are 
separate pricing contracts at home and abroad. The structure of contracts is assumed to 
be an institutional feature that is fixed.15 It is optimal for firms to engage in this kind of 
price discrimination in spite of identical elasticities of substitution in the two countries 
                                               
15
 As mentioned in Devereux and Engel (2003), it is crucial for this assumption that the aforementioned 
bonds result in payoffs denominated in currency, as opposed to goods. This forces consumers to buy goods 
at prices set for their country. 
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due to the stochastic nature of home and foreign demand. Following Corsetti and Pesenti 
(2005), and defining the pass-through elasticity *ln ( ) / ln(1/ )t tp h Sη = ∂ ∂ , the foreign-
currency price of home varieties is: 
* ( )( ) tt
t
p hp h
Sη
=
ɶ
  0 1η≤ ≤  
The two standard scenarios for exchange rate pass-through are producer currency pricing 
(PCP) and local currency pricing (LCP). The former assumes that producers set export 
prices ( )p hɶ  in their own currency, which means that the price faced by foreign 
consumer fluctuates 1:1 with the exchange rate but the profits to the firm are stable. This 
case is given by η = 1 and can also be described as complete pass-through. In contrast, if 
the exporter sets the price in the local currency of the country she exports to, the price 
does not react at all to fluctuations in the exchange rate, but profits fluctuate. This 
scenario is obtained if η = 0. 
 
Home firms choose ( )tp hɶ  in t-1 to maximize the expected discounted profit in t. The 
actual export price *p  is dependent on the realization of the exchange rate at time t. 
* *
, 1 1
1( )
1
t
t h t t
t t
MCp h P E
S Sη η
λ
λ − −
 
= =  
−  
 
The prices chosen by foreign firms are given by 
* *
1( ) 1t t tp f E MC
λ
λ −
 =  
−
 
and 
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1 *
1( ) 1t t t t tp f S E S MC
η ηλ
λ
−
−
 =  
−
 
 
2.5 Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
 
The money supply evolves according to the following process 
1t t tm m µ−= +  
where lnt tm M= . Similarly, 
* * *
1t t tm m µ−= +  
The nominal tax rates tτ  and 
*
tτ  are set as follows 
ln(1 ) ln(1 )t tTτ τ− = − +  
* * *ln(1 ) ln(1 )t tTτ τ− = − +  
Monetary and fiscal policy rules consist of rules for tµ  and tT , or *tµ  and *tT  for the 
foreign country. These policy rules respond to unanticipated shocks to productivity, so 
that 1 1 0t t t tE E Tµ− −= = . The analogue conditions hold for the foreign country. 
 
Fiscal policy is defined relative to a constant benchmark tax rate. The problem of 
characterizing the optimal fiscal policy thus technically consists of two parts. The first 
part is finding the optimal level for the benchmark tax rate and the second is concerned 
with finding an optimal rule for setting tT . When studying optimal policy below, I will 
focus mainly on the short-term stabilization decisions, implicitly assuming that the long-
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term rate has been set and remains at its level. However, the level of the long-term rate 
will be different depending on the specific scenario under investigation. 
 
 
3 Solution with Flexible Prices 
 
It is helpful to first study the equilibrium under flexible prices. With flexible prices, the 
assumption of various degrees of pass-through does not affect the results, since firms do 
not need to form expectations regarding next period's marginal costs. Marginal cost are 
given by 
(1 )
t t t
t
t t t
W PCMC κ
θ θ τ
= =
−
 
(due to (1 )
t t
t
t
PCW κ
τ
=
−
) and 
* * *
*
* *(1 )
t t
t
t t
P CMC κ
θ τ
=
−
 
Flex price consumption is given by 
*1 * 11 (1 ) (1 )n n n nt t t t tC
λ θ θ τ τλκ
− −
−
= − −  
and employment is given by 
1(1 )t tL
λ
τλκ
−
= −  
The terms of trade are given by 
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* *
*
(1 )
(1 )
ht t t
t ft t t
P
S P
θ τ
θ τ
−
=
−
 
Monetary policy has no effect in a world with flexible prices. However, the tax rate on 
labor income directly influences output in this economy. In addition, it generates a 
possibility for gains from coordination, since consumption depends on both countries' 
fiscal policy, whereas the labor supply only depends on domestic labor taxes. Assuming 
that the government maximizes consumer welfare, its problem becomes 
* *
1
1 1
max ln ln (1 ) ln ln(1 ) (1 ) ln(1 ) (1 )
t
t t t t tn n n n
τ
λ λθ θ τ τ τλκ λ−
− − 
+ + − + − + − − − − 
 
 
The optimal tax rate 1(1 ) nλλτ −− = . We obtain the standard result that the nominal tax 
should be used to subsidize labor, with the additional factor representing the share of the 
country's goods in the consumption basket. In a country which contributes relatively 
little to the consumption basket, the negative effects from taxation due to higher prices 
are not as significant because most goods in the consumption basket are produced 
abroad. However, the full benefits in terms of less disutility from labor due to taxes are 
reaped. This offers scope for improvement through international cooperation. The factor 
1
λ
λ−  compensates for the distortion caused by monopolistic competition, setting ntL κ=  
and output at tnθκ . 
 
In the following analysis, I will assume the mean tax rate in a fixed-price scenario to be 
set to the same level that would obtain in an otherwise identical flex-price scenario. For 
example, a global planner maximizing a measure of world welfare will set long-term tax 
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rates to their optimal levels 1ng λλ−  and 
(1 )
(1 ) 1
n
g
λ
λ
−
− −
 (see next subsection). In a Nash 
equilibrium, on the other hand, the two countries' average tax rates will be given by 
1n
λ
λ−  and 1(1 )n λλ−− . This is of consequence, because the level of the subsidies 
determines the marginal welfare effect of a change in the expected labor supply. 
 
3.1 Optimal Fiscal Policy with a Global Welfare Function  
 
Examining the policies chosen by a hypothetical global decision maker who is 
concerned with the welfare of citizens from both countries is an easy way to check for 
potential gains from cooperation. Let us assume that the weights applied to the welfare 
of the citizens from the two countries are given by g and 1-g, respectively. Note that the 
weights do not necessarily have to equal n and 1-n.16 In that case, the global decision 
maker maximizes 
*
* *
1 ,1
1 1
max ln(1 ) (1 ) ln(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
t t
t t t tn n g g X
τ τ
λ λ
τ τ τ τλ λ− −
− −
− + − − − − − − − +  
where X represents all of the terms independent of the choice of 1 tτ−  and 
*1 tτ− . The 
optimal choices for the tax rates are given by 1(1 ) (1 )nt g λλτ τ−− = = −  and 
( )
( )
1* *
11(1 ) (1 )
n
t g
λ
λτ τ
−
−
−
− = = − . The chosen tax rates are constant. In addition, the global 
decision maker chooses lower values for the tax rates in both countries than the national 
policy maker. The intuition behind this result stems from the fact that the national 
                                               
16
 Which needs not to be the case, because n and 1-n do not represent the countries' relative size but rather 
the relative amount of goods produced by either country. 
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decision maker only considers domestic consumption when weighing costs and benefits 
of taxation. For example, when the domestic policy maker lowers the tax rate on labor, 
the benefits of that decision accrue to both countries, in form of lower prices for 
domestically produced goods. However, the costs of that tax cut accrue only to the home 
country in form of more disutility from the work that is required to produce more of 
those goods. 
 
This spillover of fiscal policy to the other country's welfare generates the scope for gains 
from cooperation between the two countries even in the case of flexible prices. Indeed, it 
can be shown that each country is unambiguously better off when decisions on tax 
policy are made by the global decision maker rather than the national ones.17 
 
 
4 Solution with Fixed Prices 
 
With nominal rigidities, the model becomes more cumbersome to solve. In particular, 
the assumption of an elasticity of pass-through that can be different from 0 and 1 leads to 
difficulties: With PCP (η = 1), the law of one price holds and consumption in the two 
countries is equal at all times. On the other hand, with LCP (η = 0), the level of the CPI 
being faced by consumers is entirely pre-determined, since exchange rate fluctuations 
have no impact on the price of imported goods. Once η can take on any value in [0,1], 
                                               
17
 Assuming, of course, somewhat 'reasonable' weights in the global welfare function. Weights that will 
support this result are for example g = n or g = 1/2. 
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neither is generally the case. Independent of η, however, the unit elasticity of 
substitution assumption combined with zero non-monetary wealth in equilibrium yields 
* *1 1
1 t t t t t
PC P C S
n n
=
−
 
Letting lower case letters denote logged variables, we can write 
* *ln
1t t t t t
n
s p c p c
n
 
= + + − − 
− 
           (12) 
In order to arrive at the domestic welfare function, I begin with finding expressions for 
the innovation in logged variables, especially 1t t tc E c−−  and 1t t tp E p−−  (and the foreign 
country counterparts) 
( )
( ) ( )
, ,
* * 1
1 1 * *
1 1
* *
1 1
(1 )
ln ln (1 ) ln (1 ) ln
1 (1 ) (1 )
ln ( (1 )(1 ) ( (1 )(1 ))
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
H tt F t
t t t t t
t t t
t t t t
t t t t
t t t t
p np n p
PC P C S
n E n S n E
E p n n E c n n
n E p n E c n
ηλ ηλ θ τ θ τ
λ η ηλ
η η η
−
− −
− −
− −
= + −
      
= + + − + −         
− − −      
= + + − − + + − −
−
+ − + − + −
( ) ( )
* *
* *
1 1ln ln(1 ) (1 ) ln ln(1 )
t t t t
t t
p c p c
n n n Kθ τ θ τ
− −
 + − − 
− + − − − + − +
 
Here K encompasses all of the constant variance and covariance terms. Using above 
results, I get 
( ) ( )( )(1 ) * * * *1 1 1 11 (1 )nt t t t t t t t t t t tnp E p c E c p E p c E cηη−− − − −− −− = − − − − −  
or 
1 1(1 ) ( )t t t t t tp E p n s E s Kη− −− = − − −            (13) 
For this result we have used (12). Intuitively, the "unpredictable" component of the 
domestic price level is the price of imported goods, since only that price varies with the 
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exchange rate, depending on the degree of pass-through. This is why the deviation from 
the price level from its expected level is only due to the deviation of the nominal 
exchange rate from its expected level - and the higher the share of imported goods (1-n) 
in the consumption bundle and the higher the degree of pass-through η, the stronger is 
the connection. 
 
A similar approach starting with *tp  yields 
* *
1 1( ) 't t t t t tp E p n s E s Kη− −− = − − −            (14) 
The money market equilibrium condition yields 
( )( )1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( )i it t t t t t t t t t t t t t ti i ic E c p E p E p E p E c E cµ + +− − + − + + − += − + − − − + −      (15) 
for the home country and 
( )( )* * * * * * * * *1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( )i it t t t t t t t t t t t t t ti i ic E c p E p E p E p E c E cµ + +− − + − + + − += − + − − − + −      (16) 
for the foreign one. Combining (12) with (15) and (16) yields 
( )* 1 11 1 1 1( )it t t t t t t t ti is E s E s E sµ µ + − + − +− = − − −  
Guess and verify offers 
*
t t ts m m= −  
as solution. This is the familiar result that the exchange rate only depends on the relative 
monetary stances of the two countries’ monetary authorities. This in turn implies 
*
1t t t t ts E s µ µ−− = −  
Unexpected fluctuations in the exchange rate and the price level are exclusively due to 
unexpected changes in monetary policy. Furthermore, the degree to which monetary 
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policy can cause the price level to be different from its expected value hinges crucially 
on the degree of pass-through. With LCP there is no effect, and 1t t tp E p−−  will always 
be equal to zero. Combining (13) and (14) yields 
( ) ( )* * *1 1 1 (1 )( )t t t t t t t tc E c c E c η µ µ+ + +− − − = − −           (17) 
To solve for innovation to consumption in either country separately, we use a second 
expression containing both terms. 
( ) ( )
[ ] [ ]( )
* *
* *
*
1 1
* *1 1 1 1
* *
1
*1
1 11 (1 ) (1 )
1
1 1 1
2
2
1
*exp( (1 ) ( 1) (1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) )
*exp( (1 )( 1
t t t t
t t t t
t t t t
t t t t t t t t
nnPC P Cn n
H F t t
nnE C E C
E E E E
s su sT
P P E E
n n n n n n
n n
λ
λ θ τ θ τ
λ
λ θ τ θ τ
η η σ η σ η σ
η η
− −
− −
− −
−
−
− −
− −
−
−
−
−    
−   
  =    
 
=  
 
− − − − − − − −
− − +
* * * *
2) (1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) )
*exp( (1 ) (1 ) )
s su sT
cu cT c u c T
n n n n
n n n n
σ η σ η σ
σ σ σ σ
− − − − − −
− − − − − −
 
where cTσ  represents the covariance between the log of consumption and the fiscal 
policy parameter T. This in turn yields 
*
1 1 1
*
1 11
*
(1 )
ln ln (1 ) ln
ln(1 ) (1 ) ln(1 )
t t t t t t
t t
nE c n E c E c
n n
n n K
λ
λ θ θ
τ τ
− − −
− −−
+ − ≡
= − + + −
+ − + − − +
ɶ
        (18) 
From the money market equation we get 
1 1
1 1( ) ( )t t t t t t t t ti im p c E c c E p p+ +− = − − − −ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ           (19) 
where *
, ,
(1 )t H t F tp np n p= + −ɶ  and *(1 )t t tm nm n m= + −ɶ . Taking expectations at time t-1 
and solving for tpɶ , I get 
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( )t t t t t t t t t t ti ip m E c E c E c E p p− − − + − − += − + − − −ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ  
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But a close look at expression (18) shows that the first term in brackets must be zero, 
since the only terms with a time index are ln tθ  and *ln tθ , and given the AR(1) process 
we have assumed for the evolution of the productivity factor, 
1 1 1 1ln ln lnt t t t tE Eθ θ θ− + − −= = . So we get 
1
1 1 1 1
*
1 1 1
( )
( ln (1 ) ln )
t t t t t t ti
t t t t
p m E c E p p
p m n nθ θ
− − − +
− − −
= − − −
= − + − + Γ
ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ
ɶ ɶ
 
Here Γ  is a constant and I use ‘guess and verify’ to confirm that 1 1t t tE p p− + =ɶ ɶ . This in 
turn implies 
1t t t tp p uµ+ − = −ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ  
where *(1 )t t tu nu n u= + −ɶ . So (19) becomes 
1 1
1
* 1 1
1 1 1
( ) ( )
ln (1 ) ln ( ) ( )
t t t t t t t ti i
t t t t t t t t ti i
m p c E c c u
n n c E c c u
µ
µ θ θ µ
+
− − +
− = − − − −
⇔ + + − + Γ = − − − −
ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ
ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ
 
Recall that 
*
1 ln (1 ) lnt t t tE c n n Kθ θ+ = + − +ɶ  
Solving for tcɶ  yields 
* *1 1
1 11 1 1 1( ) ( ln (1 ) ln ) ( ln (1 ) ln ) 'i it t t t t t t ti i i ic u n n n nµ θ θ µ θ θ− −+ + + += − + + − + + + − + Γɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ  
so that 
* *
1 1 1( ) (1 )( )t t t t t t t t t tc E c n c E c n c E c µ− − −− = − + − − =ɶ ɶ ɶ  
Combining expressions yields 
( )*1 (1 )(1 )t t t t t tc E c n η µ µ µ−− = − − − + ɶ  
and 
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( )* * *1 (1 )t t t t t tc E c n η µ µ µ−− = − − − + ɶ  
These two expressions for the innovation to consumption collapse to the results reported 
by Devereux and Engel (2003) in the special case of η = 0 or η = 1. The interpretation of 
the factors that multiply the relative monetary stance of the two countries *t tµ µ−  is 
similar to the one given above when discussing the expression for innovations in the 
price level. Innovations to home country consumption depend more heavily on the 
foreign monetary policy stance relative to the home policy stance if the share of foreign 
goods in the consumption basket is high and if the degree of pass-through is low. 
 
 
5 Welfare Analysis 
 
Prices adjust fully after one period, so changes to the money supply prior to time t do not 
have an effect on 1t tE U− . The problem of the policy maker is reduced to maximizing the 
consumer's utility on a period-by-period basis. Following the literature, I abstract from 
the direct welfare effects of holding real balances. The inclusion of nominal income 
taxes, however, makes the term depicting disutility from labor policy-dependent in this 
case. Expected utility is given by 
[ ]1 1 lnt t t t tE U E C Lκ− −= −  
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As commonly done in the literature, I focus on expressing welfare in terms of deviation 
from the deterministic equilibrium18. Let 
ˆ ln tt
CC
C
 
≡  
 
 
where C  depicts the consumption level in the deterministic, flex-price equilibrium. The 
only nominal rigidity in the model is due to the price-setting, so the deviation of the 
consumption level from its flex-price level is a direct function of the deviation of the 
prices. 
( ), ,ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 )t H t F tC nP n P= − + −  
but 
( ) ( )( )1 (1 ) 11 , 1 12 (1 )
(1 )
2
1 1 1 1
21
12
ˆ ln var ln
( (ln ln ) (ln(1 ) ln(1 ))
( )
t t
t t t t
t tt t
t t
PC
t PC
t H t t tPC
t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t
E
E P E E
E p E p c E c
E u T
θ τ
θ τ
θ τ
θ θ τ τ
µ
− −
− − − −
−
− − − −
−
 
 = =
 
 
= − + − − − − − − −
= − −
 
where I used the results from the previous section. Similarly 
* * * 21
1 , 12
ˆ ( (1 ) )t F t t t t t tE P E u Tηµ η µ− −= + − − −  
Expected labor supply depends on fiscal policy: 
* *
1
1
1 1
1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
(1 )
t t t t t
t t
t t t t
t t
t t t
PC P C S
t t PC PC
t t S
E L E n n
E E
η
η
θ θλ
λκ
θ τ θ τ−
−
− −
− −
−
−
 
 
= + −
    
    
 
                                               
18
 The deterministic equilibrium coincides with the solution for the flex-price model given in the previous 
section, comibined with the assumption that the productivity disturbances are given and constant at 
* 1θ θ= = . This is the same notion of deterministic equilibrium as in Sutherland (2005). 
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using the assumption of log-normality in the disturbances and consequently in all of the 
endogenous model variables, this expression can be re-written as 
( )(
( ) )1
1
1
2 * 2
1 1
(1 ) exp cov(ln , ln(1 )) var(ln(1 ))
(1 )exp cov(ln ,ln(1 )) var(ln(1 ))
exp ( ) (1 )exp ( (1 ) )
t t
t
t t
t t
PC
t t t t
PC
t tS
n
t t t t t t t t t t t
E L n
n
n E u T T n E u T T
η
λ
λκ θ
θ
κ
τ τ τ
τ τ
µ ηµ η µ
−
−
−
− −
 = − − − −
 
 + − − − −  
    = − − + − + − − −    
 
I used several of the results from the previous section in the derivation. Similarly, we can 
obtain for the foreign country: 
(1 )* * * * *2 * * * *2
1 1 1(1 )exp ( ) exp ( (1 ) )nt t t t t t t t t t t t tE L n E u T T n E u T Tκ µ ηµ η µ−− − −    = − − − + + − − −    
This gives us the complete objective function for the country: 
( )
( )( )
2 (1 ) * * * 2
1 1 12 2
2 * 2
1 1
( (1 ) )
exp ( ) (1 ) exp (1 ) 1
nn
t t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t t t
E W E u T E u T
n n E u T T n E u T T
µ ηµ η µ
µ ηµ η µ
−
− − −
− −
= − − − − + − − −
   
− − − + − + − − − −    
  (20) 
The two differences between this objective function and versions in the previous 
literature (for example Corsetti and Pesenti (2005)) is the addition of a fiscal policy 
instrument and the trade-off between price stabilization (the first two terms depict the 
variation in prices for domestically and foreign produced goods in the domestic 
consumption basket) and reducing disutility from labor which is represented by the 
second line of the equation. The last two terms enter the policy maker's objective 
function because a positive covariance between the innovation to the tax rate tT  and the 
monetary policy instrument tµ  weakens any effect monetary policy alone has on output. 
If, for example, monetary policy is expansionary but tT  rises at the same time (a rise in T 
corresponds to a decrease in the tax rate τ), the increase in marginal costs due to the rise 
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in tµ  is alleviated to some degree by the simultaneous rise in (1 )tτ− . This is detrimental 
to welfare because lower marginal costs imply higher disutility from labor due to higher 
output. Following the same logic, a negative covariance between tµ  and tT  will be 
welfare enhancing. In addition, volatility in fiscal policy has a welfare increasing 
component now, as well. Examining the expression for 1t tE L−  reveals that higher 
variance of (1 )tτ−  increases the marginal cost terms 1 (1 )t tt t
PC
tE θ τ− −    and 11 (1 )
t t
t t t
PC
t S
E ηθ τ−− −
 
 
, 
thereby decreasing overall expected labor supply. The effect of time-varying fiscal 
policy on overall welfare is therefore ambiguous, as we will see in the results section. 
 
Note that choosing 0tT =  and 
* 0tT =  for all t is a feasible strategy which would leave 
the policy maker with the same dilemma Corsetti and Pesenti have described: A full 
stabilization of the domestic price gap (requiring setting t tuµ = ) is sub-optimal, due to 
the relevance of imported goods and the existence of imperfect pass-through. Only if η = 
0 or if η = 1, does the second term in (20) not play a role - in that case a purely 'inward-
looking' monetary policy is optimal. 
 
In the following section I will study the effect of the introduction of the fiscal instrument 
in a Nash equilibrium setting, as well as examine the welfare effects of coordination with 
and without fiscal policy. Throughout most of the analysis I will assume the two 
countries to be symmetric, so that n = 1/2. 
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6 Optimal Policy 
 
Assuming that both domestic and foreign policy makers can set tµ  and tT  and *tµ  and 
*
tT  freely in response to the productivity disturbances, the problem becomes a simple 
maximization of (20) and its foreign equivalent with respect to the policy variables. 
Foreign welfare is given by 
( )
(
( ) )
2 (1 )* * * * * 2
1 1 12 2
* * * *2
1
* * * *2
1
(1 ) ( )
(1 ) exp ( (1 ) )
(1 )exp 1
nn
t t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t
t t t t t
E W E u T E u T
n n E u T T
n E u T T
ηµ η µ µ
ηµ η µ
µ
−
− − −
−
−
= − + − − − − − −
  
− − + − − − 
 + − − − − 
 
In order to be able to arrive at a closed-form solution without having to resort to 
numerical simulation, I approximate the exponential terms in the welfare functions by 
linear expressions. For example, * * * *2exp(( ) )t t t tu T Tµ − −  is approximated by 
* * * *21 ( )t t t tu T Tµ+ − − . This is valid due to the nature of the AR(1) processes in this model, 
tµ , *tµ , tu , *tu , tT  and *tT  are all innovations to log-linear expressions; they can be 
interpreted to be denoting percentage values. Note also that we are analyzing the case of 
national policy makers maximizing only their respective country's welfare function and 
taking the policy decisions of the other country as given. In this setting, 1 τ−  is set to 
equal 1n λλ−  and 
*1 τ−  is equal to 1(1 )n λλ−− . 
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6.1 Monetary Policy 
 
In a Nash equilibrium, domestic monetary policy is given by 
2 2
2 2
3 2 3 3 6 3*1
2 3 4 3 3 4 3t t t
u uη η η ηη η η ηµ
− + − +
− + − +
 = +
 
 
It is not surprising that the optimal policy rule takes on the form *t t tau buµ = + , given 
the log-linear nature of the model. The expressions representing a and b are both strictly 
positive. Optimal monetary policy is accommodating: in the case of a positive 
productivity shock monetary authorities react by increasing the money supply. This 
holds for both domestic and foreign productivity shocks, although the magnitude of the 
response crucially depends on the degree of pass-through. Figure 10 depicts the weight 
on foreign and domestic productivity shocks in the setting of domestic monetary policy 
graphically, as a function of η. When pass-through is zero, the origin of productivity 
shocks is irrelevant and both countries respond identically to either shock (formally, 
* *1 1
2 2t t t tu uµ µ= = + ). 
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Figure 10. Monetary policy weights on productivity shocks 
 
If pass-through is perfect, on the other hand, the optimal monetary policy focuses solely 
on the domestic productivity shock and monetary supply changes one-for-one with 
productivity. As one moves away from those two special cases, the weight on the foreign 
shock increases monotonically as the pass-through decreases from one to zero. From the 
policy maker's perspective, a decrease in observed pass-through should thus cause a shift 
in the priorities of monetary policy. If, for example, pass-through were to decline from 
an initial level near unity, monetary policy should start putting more weight on the 
foreign productivity shock when deciding on the domestic monetary stance. 
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6.2 Fiscal Policy 
 
As soon as I allow for partial pass-through, optimal fiscal policy becomes state-
contingent, in the sense that it reacts to the productivity innovations. The optimal fiscal 
policy rule is given by 
2
( 1)*
3 4 3
( )t t tT u u η ηη η
−
− +
= −  
Figure 11 shows the factor multiplying the relative productivity disturbance ( *t tu u− ) for 
fiscal policy as a function of η. Note that fiscal policy is counter-cyclical - a positive 
shock (corresponding to an increase in tu ) is countered by a decrease in tT , which 
represents an increase in the tax rate. This dampens the effect of shocks on marginal 
costs, and thus on prices, consumption and welfare. 
 
Figure 11. Reaction of domestic fiscal policy to relative productivity shocks 
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Note that fiscal policy is a function of the relative global productivity shocks; only a 
difference between the two countries' productivity disturbances calls for a fiscal reaction. 
In case of global shocks, fiscal policy is optimally set to be constant. Formally, the 
variance of labor taxes in the home country can be decomposed 
2 * 2
1 1
* *
var(ln(1 )) * ( )
* var(ln ) var(ln ) 2cov(ln , ln )
t t t t t t
t t t t
E T K E u u
K
τ
θ θ θ θ
− −
   
− = = −   
 = + − 
 
where 2( 1)3 4 3K
η η
η η
−
− +
= . This expression clarifies how the use of fiscal stabilization depends 
on the extent to which the two disturbances are correlated. In case that there is a high 
covariance between the two shocks, fiscal policy will have a very low variance. If the 
shocks are completely independent, labor taxes will fluctuate more in order to stabilize 
prices. Notice also the effect of the pass-through of the exchange rate on the magnitude 
of the response. Use of the fiscal instrument is most significant in magnitude in 
environments that are characterized by neither zero nor perfect pass-through. If pass-
through is either very low or close to perfect, the fiscal instrument reacts only weakly to 
relative differences in productivity shocks across countries. 
 
Due to assumed symmetry, the foreign country's optimal policy choices are analogous. 
 
6.3 LCP and PCP 
 
It is striking that fiscal policy is not used at the extremes of the support of η. The reason 
is that for both η = 0 and η = 1 there is less scope for strategic interaction of the policy 
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parameters. In fact, without fiscal policy, the degree of pass-through also represents the 
degree to which domestic welfare hinges on foreign policy decisions. Formally, the first 
order condition for the optimal choice of µ is given by 
(1 ) * *1
2 2( ) ( (1 ) ) 0t t t t tu uηµ ηµ η µ−− − − + − − =  
As η approaches 1, the second part of the expression loses significance and stabilization 
of the domestic marginal costs becomes the primary concern of the policy maker. With 
perfect pass-through, the flex price allocation becomes achievable just by completely 
compensating for any change in domestic productivity through monetary policy. This 
result corresponds to previous findings investigating this special case. 
As η approaches 0, however, the second term shows that fluctuations of import prices 
become independent of foreign monetary policy. This is not surprising, if one recalls that 
local currency pricing implies that firms set prices to be constant in the market they are 
sold. With taxes, the first order condition for the choice of T is given by 
*1 1
2 2( ) ( (1 ) ) 0t t t t t tu u Tµ ηµ η µ− − + − − + =  
This condition states that T should be different from zero if there is a discrepancy 
between the gains from stabilizing the domestic price of home goods (the first term) and 
the losses due to co-movement of T and the remaining components of the foreign price 
of home goods (the second term). When η = 1, the two are identical. Likewise, when η = 
0, the fact that * *1 12 2u uµ µ= = +  ensures that they are identical. 
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6.4 Welfare Effects of Fiscal Policy 
 
I compare optimal monetary policy in the presence and in the absence of the fiscal 
instrument. This will clarify the channels through which fiscal policy has an impact on 
the two countries' welfare. Without fiscal policy as an available option, and still 
assuming equally sized countries (n=1/2), optimal monetary policy choices in a Nash 
equilibrium are given by 
2 2
2 2
( 1) ( 2 1)*
2 3 2 2 3 2t t t
u u
η η η η
η η η ηµ
− + − +
− + − +
= +  
and 
2 2
2 2
( 2 1) ( 1)* *
2 3 2 2 3 2t t t
u u
η η η η
η η η ηµ
− + − +
− + − +
= +  
Figure 12 depicts the weights monetary policy places on the two productivity shocks as a 
function of η. The picture looks similar to the case with fiscal policy depicted in Figure 
10, which is not surprising if one keeps in mind the relatively low magnitude of the 
changes to the tax rate (at its maximum, t
t
T
u
∂
∂  equals around 0.14). Figure 13 depicts the 
monetary policy weights just on the domestic productivity shock with and without an 
available fiscal instrument. 
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Figure 12.Monetary policy weights on productivity shocks in the absence of a fiscal instrument 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Weights on domestic productivity shock with and without fiscal instrument 
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Perhaps surprisingly, using the fiscal instrument leads to stronger reactions of monetary 
policy to domestic shocks while weakening the response to foreign shocks. While the 
effect of the introduction of the fiscal instrument on monetary policy seems small in 
magnitude, the effect on price fluctuations is more pronounced. 
 
Figures 14 and 15 show the change in the fluctuations of prices faced by domestic 
consumers as we include the fiscal instrument. 
 
 
Figure 14. Fluctuations of the price of the domestically produced good in the domestic market 
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Figure 15. Fluctuations of the price of the foreign produced good in the domestic market 
 
In understanding the graphs, it helps to recall that prices are constant markups over 
expected marginal costs, so price fluctuations are equivalent to fluctuations in firms' 
marginal costs. The domestic marginal costs are given by (1 )PCθ τ−  and we have seen above 
that the variance of this term can be written as [ ]2E u Tµ − − . With optimal policy 
setting, T reacts counter-cyclically to u, which 'stabilizes' the sum u + T. In fact, 
( ) ( )2 *2 2 22 2( 1) ( 1)4 5 3* 2 23 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 3var( ) var(( ) ) u uu T u u uη η η ηη ηη η η η η ησ σ− −− +− + − + − ++ = − + = − . Because fiscal 
policy modifies taxes based on relative productivity shocks, the variance of the sum (u + 
T) is a function of the variances of both shocks. 
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To further help with intuition, let us examine the case where *2 2u uσ σ= . In that case, 
2
2
3 6 5 2
3 4 3
var( ) uu T η ηη η σ
− +
− +
+ = . Figure 16 plots the coefficient. 
 
 
Figure 16. Factor of productivity shock variance passed on to (u+T) 
 
For medium levels of pass-through, the use of fiscal policy achieves a variance reduction 
of the term (u+T) of almost 30% relative to the case of constant fiscal policy (if T=0, the 
variance will clearly just be 2uσ , independent of the level of pass-through). It is this 
reduction in variance that is ultimately responsible for the drop in variance of domestic 
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prices for domestic consumers depicted in Figure 14, since monetary policy, and thus the 
variance of µ, is very similar in both scenarios.19 
 
The volatility of the price of imported goods depends on the volatility of foreign 
marginal costs and the volatility of the exchange rate. However, as we saw above, 
*
t t ts µ µ= − , so that import price volatility can be written as 
2
* * *(1 )t t t tu Tηµ η µ + − − −  . 
The introduction of fiscal policy results in a decrease in the variance of * *( )t tu T+ , 
analogous to the case of domestic prices. Figure 15 depicts the effect of this decrease on 
the overall import price volatility as a function of the pass-through parameter η. 
 
In the Nash equilibrium, the two countries' policy makers make use of fiscal policy to 
bring down fluctuations in firms' marginal costs. However, using fiscal policy in this 
way also moves expected labor supply away from its (constant) flex-price level. But the 
welfare losses caused by higher expected disutility from labor are very small and the 
gains due to reduced price volatility are larger in magnitude. Figure 17 shows the gains 
in welfare due to the availability of the fiscal instrument by plotting the factors 
multiplying * 2( )u u−  for total welfare in both cases, and Figure 18 plots the welfare 
gains from having the fiscal instrument. Note that the scope for improvement through 
the use of fiscal policy in addition to monetary policy is most pronounced in the mid-
                                               
19
 Of course, the third candidate for an explanation of the drop in (1 )var(ln )PCθ τ−  is the covariance 
between ln PC and ln( (1 ))θ τ− . In fact, that covariance decreases slightly with the introduction of 
fiscal policy, which by itself would result in an increase in (1 )var(ln )PCθ τ− . 
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range of the pass-through parameter. Furthermore, examining the neighborhood of the 
two extreme cases, there is more scope for welfare gains from fiscal stabilization for 
near-zero pass-through than in the case of near-perfect pass-through. 
 
 
Figure 17. Welfare as multiples of the disturbance variation E[u - u*]2 
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Figure 18. Gain in welfare from using fiscal instrument as a multiple of E[u - u*]2 
 
 
Finally, it is instructive to compare the implications of the availability of an additional 
fiscal instrument on the volatility of the exchange rate. Corsetti and Pesenti depict the 
policy maker's problem in an open economy with imperfect pass-through as facing a 
trade-off between complete domestic price stabilization on the one hand and perfect 
synchronization of the two countries' monetary stances (which results in a fixed 
exchange rate) on the other. In this model, the policy decisions with LCP and PCP are 
identical to their results - the exchange rate is still fixed when η = 0 and firm marginal 
costs are still held constant when η = 1. However, is fiscal policy used to reduce 
exchange rate fluctuations for mid-range values of the elasticity of pass-through? 
Because exchange rate volatility is given by * 2( )t tE µ µ− , the slightly stronger response 
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to the domestic productivity shock and the weaker response to the foreign shock result in 
larger exchange rate fluctuations in the scenario with fiscal policy. The second 
instrument is not used to achieve a more stable exchange rate. 
 
The addition of a fiscal instrument does not lead the two countries to choose more 
similar monetary stances. The only case where the exchange rate ends up being constant 
is the case of LCP - but this result is obtained without fiscal policy, as well. 
 
 
7 Policy Coordination 
 
7.1 Solution to a Global Planner’s Problem 
 
In this class of two-country models it is well known that there are no gains from 
monetary policy coordination when the focus is only on the cases of LCP and PCP 
(Benigno and Benigno (2003), Benigno (2004)). In other words, a Global Planner that 
were to maximize a weighted sum of the two countries' welfare functions would choose 
exactly the same policies as the countries choose independent of each other. Even 
without fiscal policy, there are gains from cooperation as soon as we allow for general 
degrees of pass-through. Without time-varying taxes and focusing on the symmetric case 
of n = (1/2) and equal country weights in the Global Planner's objective function, labor 
supply is constant and global welfare can thus be written as 
 78 
( )
( )
2 * * 21 1 1
2 4 4
* 2 * * 21 1 1
2 4 4
( ) ( (1 ) )
( (1 ) ) ( )
GW E u u
u u
µ ηµ η µ
ηµ η µ µ
= − − − + − −
+ − + − − − − 
         (21) 
The optimal monetary policy rules set by the Global Planner are given by 
2 2
2 2
1 2 1 3 2 *
2 4 4 2 4 4
u u
η η η η
η η η ηµ
− + − +
− + − +
= +  
and 
2 2
2 2
1 3 2 1 2* *
2 4 4 2 4 4
u u
η η η η
η η η ηµ
− + − +
− + − +
= +  
Due to symmetry, there are only two terms that can be manipulated by the policy maker, 
fluctuation in the price index for domestic goods and the price index for imported goods. 
Figures 19 and 20 show the effect of policy coordination on these indices; Figure 21 
shows the net gain in welfare due to coordination. 
 
 
Figure 19. Fluctuations in the price index for domestically produced goods 
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Figure 20. Fluctuations in the price index for imported goods 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Welfare gain from monetary policy coordination 
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The benefits from coordination depend strongly on the degree of pass-through. 
Interestingly, the increases in welfare relative to the Nash case are generated exclusively 
by reducing fluctuations in the price index for domestically produced goods for low 
degrees of pass-through (η < 1/2). Another look at the objective function () delivers an 
explanation. When setting the monetary stance µ, the domestic country's policy maker 
balances the two conflicting objectives of choosing a value that compensates for the 
domestic productivity shock u and one that compensates for the foreign productivity 
shock *u , because µ enters the exchange rate and thus also the pricing decision of the 
foreign exporting firms. The global planner, however, includes one more price in the 
stabilization problem - the price of domestic goods that are exported to the foreign 
country. But this also involves counter-acting the swings of u rather than *u . This 
generates the somewhat counter-intuitive result that a more global perspective leads to 
domestic monetary policy reacting more strongly to the domestic productivity shock. 
The result is a decrease in the squared difference [ ]2uµ −  for almost all values of η, as 
we can see in Figure 19. But for high degrees of pass-through, fluctuations in export 
prices 
2
*(1 ) uηµ η µ − − −   approach those of the domestic index - and thus the higher 
emphasis on the domestic productivity shock starts 'paying off' in terms of lower price 
fluctuations as the elasticity of pass-through exceeds 0.5, as can be seen in Figure 20. 
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Gains from monetary policy coordination arise under partial pass-through. Interestingly, 
those gains are realized due to the fact that countries react too strongly to foreign 
productivity shocks in the absence of coordination, rather than too little. 
 
Next I will turn to the question of gains from coordination with fiscal policy as an 
additional instrument. What turns out to be of significance in this approach is the 
assumption regarding each country's choice for the steady state labor tax rate. Assuming 
that the global planner determines both aspects of fiscal policy, average labor subsidies 
in both countries will be raised, as discussed above. As a result, the first-best allocation 
becomes achievable, because the labor subsidy compensates for the markup chosen by 
the monopolistic producers. In the simplest case, assuming that n = g = (1/2), the global 
objective function is given by 
(
)
(
)
2 * * * 21 1 1
2 4 4
2 * 21 1
2 2
* 2 * * * 21 1 1
2 4 4
* * * *2 * * * *21 1
2 2
( ) ( (1 ) )
(( ) ) (( (1 ) ) )
( (1 ) ) ( )
(( (1 ) ) ) (( ) )
GLW E u T u T
u T T u T T
u T u T
u T T u T T
µ ηµ η µ
µ ηµ η µ
ηµ η µ µ
ηµ η µ µ
= − − − − + − − −
− − − − + − − −
+ − + − − − − − −

− + − − − − − − 
       (22) 
Lines one and three of the welfare function correspond to stabilizing the CPIs of the two 
countries, as we saw before. Lines two and four capture the effect of variations in fiscal 
policy on the expected labor supply. Assuming the Global Planner can optimally set all 
four policies after observing the productivity shocks in both countries, the interior 
solution to the program calls for the following policies: 
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So the introduction of the fiscal instrument does not change the planner's policies at all! 
The reason for the constant tax rate lies in the marginal effect of an increase in labor 
subsidies on global welfare: 
*1 1 1 1 1
4 4 2 4 2
*1
4
1
2
( ) ( ) ( (1 ) )
( (1 ) )
GLW
u T u T u T
T
u T
T
µ µ ηµ η µ
ηµ η µ
∂
= − − − − + − + − − +
∂
+ + − − −
=
 
Clearly, an interior solution must have the property that T = 0.20 The comparison 
between cooperation and Nash scenarios with fiscal policy is thus made difficult by the 
different treatment of the average tax rate which in turn has implications for the marginal 
effect of a change in the labor tax on the expected disutility from work. In particular, the 
cooperative scenario does not support interior solutions with tax rates reacting to relative 
productivity shocks as in the non-cooperative case. The reason lies in the two ways that 
fiscal policy uncertainty enters this model: On the one hand, fiscal policy rules can 
decrease CPI fluctuations by making marginal costs depend on a linear combination of 
both countries' productivity shocks as is the case in the Nash equilibrium solution. On 
the other hand, both fluctuations in the tax rate itself and a negative covariance between 
                                               
20
 An examination of a corner solution is not helpful at this point. A budget constraint motivated upper 
bound on T depends on the support of the productivity shocks. In addition, for very large absolute values 
of T the approximation 2 2exp (( ) ) 1 (( ) )E u T T E u T Tµ µ− − ≈ + − −  will not hold. 
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T and PCθ  are welfare enhancing by unambiguously raising expected marginal costs, 
thereby raising prices, decreasing quantities demanded and thus decreasing disutility 
from work. The Global Planner's problem weighs these two effects against each other 
and the result is a fiscal policy that is independent of the choices for either country's 
monetary stance. This severs the link between fiscal and monetary policy and results in 
non state-contingent fiscal policy being the only equilibrium. 
 
Concerning the reduction of volatility in consumption there are thus no further gains 
from cooperation once we take into account fiscal policy. However, due to the higher 
level of subsidies reflected in larger values for 1 τ−  and *1 τ− , the level of global 
welfare will still be higher with fiscal policy through the subsidies to labor that 
overcome the artificially low level of output due to monopolistic competition. 
 
Note that the Nash equilibrium with taxes coincides with the Global Planner's solution 
only in the cases of LCP and PCP. The introduction of fiscal policy does not make a 
difference regarding the absence of gains from cooperation in those two cases. 
 
7.2 Optimal Policy in a Monetary Union 
 
In this section I will assume that the union policy maker has the same objective function 
(22) as the Global Planner in the previous section. The issue at stake is optimal policy 
given the constraint of a monetary union. 
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Knowing that *µ µ=  will hold, the optimal fiscal policy stance for the home country is 
given by 
0tT =  
Independent of the relative country size and the degree of pass-through, countries will 
opt not to use their fiscal instruments in the case of a monetary union. The reason is 
again the fact that a manipulation of the tax rate will result in changes in the expected 
marginal costs which are welfare neutral: The stabilization gains are exactly equal to the 
losses due to higher expected labor supply. tµ  now describes the policy stance chosen 
by the centralized monetary authority. The optimal policy rule is given by 
*(1 )t t tnu n uµ = + −  
The effect of a monetary union is thus to eliminate the dependence of the policy choices 
on the parameter η as well as the deactivation of the use of fiscal instruments. How do 
fluctuations in the marginal cost compare to the non-union case? Simple algebra reveals 
that the fluctuations in domestic market prices are now equal for domestically and 
foreign produced goods. In both cases, the fluctuations are equal to * 214 ( )t tu u− . Taking a 
look back at Figure 14 shows that with regard to prices of domestically produced goods, 
a monetary union results in a more volatile price index in all cases except LCP, in which 
case all of the scenarios examined thus far arrive at the same policy prescriptions. 
However, Figure 22 shows the sense in which the use of fiscal policy is a substitute for 
forming a monetary union (with the y-axis again depicting the factor multiplying 
* 2( )E u u −  ) 
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Figure 22. Fluctuation in the domestic price index for imported goods under different regimes 
 
For low degrees of pass-through (in fact, for η<0.5), a monetary union setting a joint 
monetary stance for both countries causes lower fluctuations in the price index for 
imported goods than those obtained when the two countries decide on monetary policy 
in a Nash equilibrium. However, this result ceases to hold once we allow countries to use 
fiscal stabilization instruments in addition to monetary policy. Allowing for fiscal policy 
thus does not move two countries closer to forming a monetary union in this kind of 
model, instead it further magnifies the loss in welfare caused by forming one in the first 
place. To illustrate this point more strongly, Figure 23 shows total expected global 
welfare in the three scenarios of Monetary Union, Nash equilibrium with an available 
fiscal instrument and Nash equilibrium without the fiscal instrument. 
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Figure 23. Welfare under three different regimes 
 
In the case of Local Currency Pricing, all three scenarios result in the same welfare. 
However, as soon as pass-through is positive, the monetary union results in fluctuations 
in expected marginal costs which are avoided in the case of country-specific monetary 
policy that is sensitive to the degree of pass-through. Furthermore, introducing fiscal 
policy which also reacts to the productivity shocks in a way that depends on the degree 
of pass-through, increases welfare further. 
 
7.3 Optimal Policy in a Fiscal Union 
 
The assumptions are parallel to the previous case: There is a central authority that sets 
the joint fiscal policy for both countries. The two countries still have control over their 
respective monetary stances tµ  and *tµ . The two countries set monetary policy in a Nash 
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equilibrium and take T as given. The central authority then in turn maximizes global 
welfare taking the two countries' reaction functions as given.21 
 
The countries' first order conditions result in the following two expressions. 
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
1 1 2 2 1*
22 3 2 2 3 2
1 1 2 2 1* *
22 3 2 2 3 2
t t t t
t t t t
u u T
u u T
η η η η η
ηη η η η
η η η η η
ηη η η η
µ
µ
− + − + −
−
− + − +
− + − + −
−
− + − +
= + +
= + +
 
One can show that the optimal fiscal policy reaction by a centralized fiscal institution in 
this case is to set T = 0 for all t. In a fiscal union, the social planner's choice of constant 
labor tax rates will be replicated. But this will result in optimal monetary policy choices 
by the two countries that are identical to the case in which there is no fiscal instrument at 
all! Thus, with regards to welfare, the case of a fiscal union is just equivalent to a de-
centralized setting in which fiscal policy is not an available instrument (apart from the 
gains achieved from choosing globally optimal levels for the constant subsidies, as 
already discussed above). 
 
 
8 Asymmetric Countries 
 
In this section I examine the implications of moving away from the assumption of 
symmetric countries. As a benchmark, I will first look at the welfare consequences in the 
model without fiscal policy. 
                                               
21
 In analyzing the cases of monetary and fiscal union it does not make a difference whether we assume 
simultaneous policy setting or whether we assume that the union has a Stackelberg lead. 
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Figure 24. Monetary policy weights for home country 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25. Monetary policy weights for foreign country 
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Figures 24 and 25 show the monetary policy weights in the case where n=(1/4), so 75% 
of the goods in the consumption basket are produced in the foreign country. The results 
for LCP and PCP stay robust, the only difference being the case of zero pass-through, 
where both countries' reaction to the foreign productivity shock is of three times the 
magnitude as the reaction to the domestic shock, reflecting the ratio 1 n
n
−
. 
 
Examining the two countries' welfare in this case, I find that there is virtually no 
difference (see Figure 26). There is very little scope for leveraging the bigger share in 
the consumption basket for welfare gains at the expense of the other country. 
 
Turning now to the case with fiscal instruments, I find that the 'large' foreign country 
sets fiscal policy to be only a third as responsive to relative productivity shocks as the 
small home country (Figure 27). This, in turn, leads to a lower covariance between the 
innovation to the logged tax rate and the logged marginal costs net of taxes. As shown 
above, expected disutility from work is lowered through higher expected marginal costs, 
increasing welfare in the 'large' country. Figure 28 shows that fiscal policy allows the big 
country to enjoy welfare that is closer to the flex price level than the smaller country.  
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Figure 26. Welfare with asymmetric countries and without fiscal instruments 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Tax response to relative productivity shock 
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Figure 28. Welfare with asymmetric countries and fiscal instruments 
 
 
9 Conclusions 
 
The addition of fiscal stabilization instruments in form of labor income taxes in a Neo-
Keynesian two-country model affects policy decisions in a non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium. This result depends critically on allowing for a general elasticity of pass-
through, since fiscal policy is not used at the two extremes of zero pass-through (LCP) 
and perfect pass-through (PCP). This finding provides further motivation for studying 
implications of partial pass-through, especially in light of recent empirical work showing 
prevalence of partial pass-through in most of the countries studied. When facing 
declining levels of pass-through, optimal monetary policy becomes more responsive to 
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foreign productivity shocks and optimal fiscal policy starts playing a more active 
stabilization role. 
 
The additional fiscal instruments do not free up monetary policy to stabilize the 
exchange rate - in fact monetary policy reacts more strongly to domestic productivity 
shocks in the scenario with fiscal instruments, thereby increasing exchange rate variance. 
Fiscal policy reacts counter-cyclically to relative productivity shocks (that is taxes are 
temporarily lowered in response to a decrease in domestic productivity, but raised in 
response to a decrease in foreign productivity), while monetary policy is procyclical. 
The lower taxes do not increase labor supply (which is assumed to be perfectly elastic), 
but instead have an impact due to the nominal rigidities that are standard in these 
models. Firms form expectations about marginal costs one period ahead, and monetary 
and fiscal policy rules are taken into account (i.e. commitment is possible by 
assumption). The counter-cyclical nature of the fiscal rule in combination with its being 
set to be proportional to the two countries' relative productivity shocks ends up reducing 
pricing risk, thereby resulting in lower expected prices and higher expected consumption 
and welfare. 
 
The results suggest that adding fiscal stabilization instruments is not sufficient to 
overturn the frequent finding that Neo-Keynesian models generally will not predict the 
endogenous formation of monetary unions. The only case where the two countries 
choose to fix their exchange rate remains that of zero pass-through. Imposing a monetary 
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union will result in lower welfare than the case with independent monetary authorities. 
Gains from coordination with respect to fiscal policy are reaped only through higher 
levels of (constant) labor subsidies in both countries. 
 
In order to keep it tractable, this model was built making several simplifying 
assumptions. It would be interesting to study the impact of labor income taxes on a non-
trivial financial sector, i.e. one that allows countries to borrow or lend in equilibrium. In 
addition, and not unrelated, it would be interesting to relax the assumption of availability 
of lump-sum transfers to the government, which essentially lets the fiscal policy maker 
use taxes as stabilization instruments without any concern about the government budget 
constraint. 
 
Another interesting avenue for future research is the assumed exogeneity of pass-
through. In this paper, I assume pass-through to be a strictly microeconomic 
phenomenon whose determination is outside the model and, most importantly, 
independent of policy. This is a simplification as there is some evidence linking pass-
through to macroeconomic aggregates such as inflation. The incorporation of a more 
detailed treatment of pass-through may result in additional channels connecting optimal 
policy to degree of pass-through. I leave these extensions for future work. 
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CHAPTER IV 
VERTICAL FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Globalization commentators frequently express concern about vertical specialization by 
firms. Firms that move production stages abroad are regarded as 'unpatriotic' and causing 
harm to the domestic economy. In his 2004 campaign, John Kerry referred to U.S. 
corporations shifting jobs abroad as 'Benedict Arnolds', a traitor during the 
Revolutionary War. In the 2008 election campaign, tax credits were suggested for 
'patriotic' firms that keep jobs at home. 
 
Economic globalization is on the rise due to a continuing drop in communication and 
coordination costs, which allows firms to use ever more creative production processes 
that involve geographic separation. Generally, the result is lower costs which in turn 
leads to lower output prices, which has lead firms with exclusively domestic production 
sites so far as to claim that they can only survive by geographically moving production 
stages. 
 
But what are the consequences if firms are given the option to geographically separate 
stages of the production process? What kind of firms will in fact use that option in a 
 95 
world with heterogeneity, and what are the general welfare implications of this facet of 
'globalization'? 
 
To understand foreign direct investment (FDI), it is of great importance to understand 
why it occurs. Most previous literature has studied variations across industries and 
identified characteristics that are conducive to FDI. More recent work has begun to 
determine which firms within an industry engage in FDI. The interest of trade theory in 
single firms is still a relatively recent phenomenon. Empirical results by Bernard and 
Jensen (1995, 1999) and Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) have shown that firms that 
export are significantly different from firms that do not. On average, exporting firms are 
larger, more productive, more capital-intensive, more technology-intensive, and pay 
higher wages than firms that sell only domestically. Later work has confirmed the 
robustness of these findings across countries and industries. More recently work by 
Feliciano and Lipsey (2002, 2006) suggests that foreign-owned firms are significantly 
different from their domestically owned peers. Again, they are on average more 
productive and pay higher wages. Melitz (2003) was the first to provide a theoretical 
model of trade with heterogeneous firms that generated the result that the most 
productive firms export, firms with lower productivity choose to produce only for the 
domestic market and firms with very low productivity exit the market. Helpman, Melitz 
and Yeaple (2004) extend the model to incorporate horizontal foreign direct investment. 
In accordance with the empirical facts, the firms sort themselves according to their 
productivity into firms that engage in FDI, export, only produce for the domestic market 
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or exit. In another recent paper, Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2006) study the effects 
of firm heterogeneity on firm choice between various integration strategies. While their 
'menu' of strategies for each firm is larger than what I allow for in this paper, their 
modeling of the production process differs from mine. The main difference is that firms 
draw one general productivity parameter for overall marginal costs and that there is no 
explicit modeling of a firm-specific factor that is assumed to be a key driver of vertical 
FDI. 
 
For the questions addressed by this paper, the key is to recognize that not all firms in a 
given industry make the same decision regarding whether to shift production abroad. 
Thus, there have to be underlying firm-specific differences that affect the decision. In the 
spirit of Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004), this paper attempts to understand these 
differences by allowing for heterogeneity across firms. 
 
There are two production stages, management and manufacturing. Firms are 
heterogeneous in the sense that they draw two (independent) productivity parameters for 
the two distinct production stages. A firm's 'management' serves the role of a firm-
specific asset that can be used to service plants abroad, as first introduced by Helpman 
(1984). There are no transportation costs for management, but management has to occur 
in the home country. 
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Without the option to move production abroad, the model resembles a two-dimensional 
version of Melitz (2003). In equilibrium, firms with draws that result in high marginal 
costs immediately exit, while the remaining ones produce. Adding the option to move 
production abroad, the paper shows that there is a threshold level of management 
productivity beyond which it becomes attractive to engage in vertical FDI. Furthermore, 
the subsequent gains decrease in initial manufacturing productivity - so that the firms 
that choose to keep producing domestically are the ones with very high manufacturing 
productivity. Importantly for welfare considerations, the introduction of the possibility to 
move production abroad allows high management productivity firms to enter production 
which otherwise would have exited due to low manufacturing productivity. On the other 
hand, low management productivity firms that previously would have entered now have 
to exit, instead. Thus the model predicts an ambiguous change in the number of varieties, 
but an increase in aggregate productivity. 
 
Section two of the paper will introduce the model; section three presents the closed 
economy equilibrium. Section four describes the changes in the open economy and the 
assumptions made. Section five describes the new equilibrium. Section six compares the 
open and closed economy equilibria and discusses the effects of 'globalization'. Finally, 
section seven concludes. 
 
 
 
 98 
2 The Model 
 
2.1 The Setup 
 
Firms in two countries, North and South, use labor to produce goods. The South only has 
one sector, which produces a homogeneous good. The home country (assumed to be the 
North) has two sectors, one of which produces the same homogeneous good while the 
other sector produces differentiated products. A fraction β of income is spent on 
differentiated goods, while the remaining income is spent on the homogenous good, 
which is the numeraire. Both countries are endowed with L units of labor; labor is 
supplied inelastically. In what follows I will always assume that β is small enough such 
that both countries produce the homogenous good and factor price equalization prevails. 
The common wage rate is normalized to equal one. 
 
The consumer side of the model follows the literature using the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) 
differentiated goods setup. The representative consumer has a CES utility function of the 
form 
1
( )U q d ρρ
ω
ω ω
∈Ω
 =
 ∫  
where Ω  represents the mass of available goods. Let Q be the aggregate good, so 
Q U≡ . Furthermore, the aggregate price is given by 
1
1 1( )P p dσ σ
ω
ω ω− −
∈Ω
 =
 ∫  
 99 
 
Optimal consumption and expenditure decisions are given by 
( )( ) pq Q
P
σ
ω
ω
−
 
=   
 
and 
1( )( ) pr R
P
σ
ω
ω
−
 
=   
 
R is aggregate expenditure and given by ( )R PQ r d
ω
ω ω
∈Ω
= = ∫ . 
 
Note that σ>1 represents the elasticity of substitution and is linked to ρ by 11σσ ρ− = . In the 
differentiated sector, there is a continuum of firms with mass M. Each firm produces a 
differentiated good ω, resulting in monopolistic competition. The production of one unit 
of the final good requires two inputs, both of which are produced using labor, a unit of 
manufacturing and a unit of management. Both input units are good-specific, so 
manufacturing and management input by a firm that produces variety ω can only be used 
in the production of the final good of type ω. There is no inter-firm trade in intermediate 
goods. The amount of labor used by each firm is a linear function of output: 
1 2DL f a q a q= + +  
Fixed cost of production is given by Df  and is identical for each firm. 1a   
represents the productivity of the firm in the production stage, since it is the number of 
workers needed for one unit of manufacturing input. Similarly, 2a  represents the firm's 
productivity in management. Note that this implies that the firm's marginal costs are 
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equal to 1 2a a+ . Firms are heterogeneous in the sense that each firm draws the 
productivity parameters from two distributions 1( )g a  and 2( )h a . The two random 
variables are independent. A higher productivity firm is a firm that produces a variety at 
a lower cost than another firm. Thus cost advantages and productivity advantages are 
equivalent. Cost advantages can occur in the production or manufacturing stage or both. 
 
As is well known for these models, the firms choose a pricing rule which involves a 
markup over marginal cost. The markup is a function of the elasticity of substitution: 
[ ] [ ]1 2 1 2 1 21( , ) 1
Wp a a a a a aσ
σ ρ
= + = +
−
 
Here 1 1σρ σ −=  is the markup, with ρ as a measure of substitutability between goods. W 
represents the (normalized) wage rate. An advantage of this setup is that firm output, 
profit and revenue can all be characterized as functions of 1a  and 2a : 
[ ] [ ]1 11 2 1 2( , )r a a R P a aσ σρ − −= +  
[ ] [ ] [ ]1 1 11 2 1 2 1 2( , ) D DRa a P a a f B a a fσ σ σpi ρσ
− − −
= + − ≡ + −  
where [ ] 1RB P σσ ρ −≡  describes a demand factor that is exogenous to the individual 
firm’s decision.  
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An equilibrium is characterized by a mass M of firms and distributions 1 2( | )a aµ  and 
2( )aγ  over supports 1(0, )a  and 2(0, )a , respectively.22 P is given by 
( ) 112 1 11 2 1 2 1 2 20 0 ( , ) ( | ) ( )a aP p a a M a a da a da σσ µ γ −− =   ∫ ∫  
I will define an average productivity level aɶ  such that 
1
1 ( , )P M p a aσ−= ɶ ɶ . aɶ  represents a 
weighted average, where the weights are given by relative output shares 
[ ]( ) 112 1 11 2 1 2 1 2 20 01 ( | ) ( )2 a aa a a a a da a da σσ µ γ −− = +  ∫ ∫ɶ  
Equilibrium quantities for aggregates in the economy can now be simply displayed as 
functions of the weighted average productivity level aɶ .23 Quantitatively there is no 
difference between the aggregate outcomes of the case of M firms drawing their 
productivity levels randomly from the distributions given above and the case of M 
representative, identical firms with the productivity parameter aɶ  for both manufacturing 
and management. This allows me to write aggregate revenue R, output Q and profit Π as 
a function of aɶ  only: 
( )2 1
1
1
1
1
1 2 1 2 1 2 20 0
( , ) ( | ) ( ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , )
( , )
a a
R r a a M a a da a da Mr a a
R Mr a aQ M q a a M q a a
P M p a a
M a a
σ
ρσ
σ
µ γ
pi
−
−
= =
= = = =
Π =
∫ ∫ ɶ ɶ
ɶ ɶ
ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ
ɶ ɶ
ɶ ɶ
 
                                               
22
 The choice to describe the distribution of manufacturing productivity conditional on management 
productivity is an arbitrary one at this point due to the symmetry of the setup. 
23
 Note that aɶ  represents average productivity at each production stage. Thus average productivity in 
producing the final good in the economy is given by 2aɶ .  
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Note that ( , )q a aɶ ɶ  denotes the quantity produced by a firm with both productivity levels 
equal to aɶ . 
 
2.2 Entry and Exit of Firms 
 
There are an infinite number of potential entrants into the differentiated goods sector. 
Before entering, firms are identical. As soon as a firm decides to enter, it draws 
productivity parameters for its manufacturing and its management stage. The 
distributions for the parameters are given by 1( )g a  and 2( )h a , respectively. The 
supports are given by 1(0, ]a  and 2(0, ]a . The two draws are assumed to be independent. 
Also, entering requires the payment of a one-time fixed cost, ef . The random draws 
imply that a firm does not know its own productivity before entering the industry. This 
appears to be a realistic assumption in accord with the empirical fact that a large number 
of start-ups fail soon after they enter their respective industry. 
 
Once a firm has entered the industry and decides to stay, its productivity parameters 
remain constant over the lifetime of the firm. 
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3 Equilibrium without Vertical FDI 
 
Without vertical FDI, the two stages of production of the final good are symmetric. Is is 
helpful to introduce ( )f MC  to denote the distribution of the sum of 1a  and 2a , because 
the only value that is relevant to the decisions of the firms is total marginal cost 1 2a a+ . 
Firms that draw productivity levels that result in marginal costs that are higher than 
some cutoff *MC  will exit the industry, while all other firms will enter and produce. 
 
In order to find the unique cutoff level for marginal cost *MC , I use the following two 
equilibrium conditions: 
1
*
DB MC f
σ−
  =               (23) 
and 
( )* 10 ( )MC D eBa f f a da fσ− − =∫            (24) 
Condition (23) ensures that the firm with marginal costs that are at the cutoff level will 
make zero profits. (24) ensures that expected operating profits (given by the left-hand 
side) are equal to the initial entry costs ef . Figures 29 and 30 show the equilibrium 
graphically. Note that σ>1, so that an increase in the term 1MC σ−  corresponds to an 
increase in productivity. 
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Figure 29. Profits with domestic production 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30. Exit and entry decision as a function of the productivity draws 
 
Note that the slope of the profit line in Figure 29 is given by B. 
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 4 ‘Opening Up’ the Model to Vertical FDI 
 
In this paper, the process of globalization is studied insofar as it allows firms to move 
parts of their production processes into other countries. Deliberately, all of the other 
elements of two-country models are abstracted from. In particular, there is no costly 
trade between the two countries, which implies that exporting is no different from 
domestic sales and in the homogenous product sector it is of no relevance whether a 
good produced in the home country is also consumed there or possibly exported to the 
foreign country. 
 
Each firm in the differentiated sector in the home country is now assumed to have the 
choice to engage in Vertical FDI, which in this context means moving the manufacturing 
production stage into the foreign country. I assume that the management stage is tied to 
the home country. This assumption seems plausible taking into account factors such as 
political pressure to keep headquarters operations within the home country and stylized 
facts that show that affiliates of U.S. multinationals have seen an increase in 
manufacturing employment over the last decades while manufacturing employment in 
the U.S. has declined.24 
 
The literature names two main factors that influence a firm's decision to relocate their 
production abroad. The main driver is the potential for cost savings, which are mostly 
                                               
24
 See, for example, Wynne and Kersting (2008). 
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brought about by lower wages and reduction in other costs (for example lower 
environmental standards). On the other hand, moving stages of the production process 
abroad incurs additional transportation cost, since the intermediate goods have to be 
shipped for further processing. I combine these two counteracting factors into one 
stylized effect of vertical FDI, which is modeled to be a new draw of the manufacturing 
productivity parameter. The new draw then completely replaces the 'old' draw for 1a . In 
other words, the decision to move the manufacturing stage is complete and final - once a 
firm decides to invest abroad, it can only choose to exit if the new draw is too high - it 
cannot move production back to the home country. Also, all of a firm's manufacturing 
takes place in the foreign country, once it chooses to engage in vertical FDI. 
 
There is empirical support for the notion that firms that move parts of their production 
process abroad are indeed 'rewarded' by higher labor productivity in their plants. Goerg, 
Hanley and Strobl (2005) find that Irish plants that use a larger share of imported inputs 
also display higher levels of labor productivity. The effect is relatively stronger when the 
imported inputs are materials rather than services and for plants that are 'embedded in 
international markets' which means that the plant is either foreign-owned or exports its 
products to foreign markets. 
 
The fact that the draw is uncertain captures the effect that the exact gains from vertical 
investment are often unknown to the firm prior to the undertaking. Furthermore, once a 
firm decides to manufacture abroad rather than domestically, the overhead costs increase 
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from Df  to Of . Similar to the fixed cost for exporters in Melitz (2003) and the increased 
overhead costs for exporters and firms that engage in horizontal FDI in Helpman et al. 
(2004), opening up a new production site in a different country is bound to incur initial 
setup costs which do not vary with output. These setup costs can be caused by having to 
acquire information on foreign factor markets and comply with foreign regulations, laws 
etc. These costs cannot be avoided by the firm and are subject to manipulation by 
foreign governments. In particular, one can think of the ongoing process of global 
economic integration as reducing these fixed costs of outsourcing, which is a scenario I 
will turn to later. 
 
Obviously, the distribution of the 'new' manufacturing productivity parameters is crucial. 
It is not clear whether the distribution should be correlated with a firm's initial parameter 
draws. Several scenarios can be envisioned:  
 
 A firm with high management productivity may have an advantage in any area of 
its business and thus also in making vertical investment decisions. The 
consequence would be a positive correlation between the initial realization of 1a  
and the newly drawn parameter 1
Na . 
 
 A firm with high initial manufacturing productivity may be able to bring some of 
those advantages to bear in the new market. The consequence would be a 
positive correlation between the initial realization of 1a  and the new parameter 
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1
Na . A recent paper by Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2006) makes the 
assumption that the wage rate in the South is lower than in the North, and that 
firms that relocate their production thus have lower marginal costs by the factor 
of w<1. This setup is a special case of a scenario with correlated marginal costs, 
specifically the formal assumption is 1 1
Na wa= . 
 
 Setting up production in a new country is sufficiently removed from initial 
operations in the home country to warrant no significant correlation between a 
firm's initial draws and the new draw. 
 
As a first step in modeling the vertical FDI decision this way I abstract from potential 
correlations. In addition, I will assume that the distribution of the new draw is 
degenerate, simplifying the analysis further. In other words, outsourcing always results 
in the same productivity for manufacturing, which is denoted by 1
Na . After the analysis 
of this case, I discuss the necessary steps to generalize the result and in what way the 
uncertain case will yield similar results. 
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5 Equilibrium with Vertical FDI 
 
5.1 Fixed Rewards from Vertical FDI 
 
This section starts with an analysis of the case of a degenerate distribution for the new 
productivity parameter after Vertical FDI. By assumption, every firm that moves its 
manufacturing stage abroad receives a new manufacturing productivity of 1
Na . 
 
The fact that vertical FDI can only improve the manufacturing part of the marginal cost 
has an immediate, interesting implication. There is now a minimum productivity level in 
management *2a  that a firm has to reach in order to consider investing in production in 
the foreign country. *2a  is implicitly defined by: 
1
* *
1 2 1 2( , )N N Oa a B a a f
σ
pi
−
 = + =   
Here O Df f>  represents the higher overhead for firms that engage in vertical FDI. 
Clearly, in equilibrium (for a given B) all firms with a draw for management marginal 
cost that is greater than *2a  will not consider moving production, because the gain 
through lower marginal costs will not compensate for the increase in overhead costs 
from Df  to Of . This splits the firms along management productivity lines: 
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 Firms that have drawn *2 2a a<  will consider outsourcing and are also guaranteed 
to enter production (since 1Na  is deterministic). However, if their draw for 1a  is 
close enough or even lower than 1
Na  they will choose not to move production 
because marginal cost will not fall by enough (and possibly not at all). The cutoff 
value for 1a  which makes these firms exactly indifferent between domestic 
manufacturing and vertical FDI is denoted by 1
pa . 
 
 Firms that have drawn *2 2a a>  will either choose domestic production or exit. So 
for these firms there will be a cutoff level for 1a , denoted by 
*
1a , above which 
they are forced to exit altogether. 
 
It is still true that expected operating profits have to be exactly equal to the fixed entry 
cost ef : 
[ ]
[ ]
*
2 11
1
*
2 1 2
*
2
11
1 2 1 1 2 1 20 0
( ) 1
1 2 1 20
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
p
p
a a a N
e D O
a
a a a
D
a
f B a a f dG a B a a f dG a dH a
B a a f dG a dH a
σσ
σ
−
−
−
     = + − + + −       
  + + −   
∫ ∫ ∫
∫ ∫
 
In addition, the conditions for the various cutoff levels are now given by 
1
*
1 2 2
1 1
1 2 2 1 2
1
*
1 2
( )
( )
D
p N
D O
N
O
B a a a f
B a a a f B a a f
B a a f
σ
σ σ
σ
−
− −
−
 + = 
   + − = + −   
 + = 
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The list of unknowns is * *1 1 2, , ,
pB a a a  (for a given 2a ) – so we have four unknowns in 
four equations. While the problem for firms with 2a  above 
*
2a  is still described by a 
graph like Figure 29, the two profit functions for firms that engage in vertical FDI are 
shown in Figure 31:  
 
 
Figure 31. Profits from Vertical FDI vs. domestic production 
 
The upper envelope of the two profit functions reflects the profits of a firm with a draw 
of 2a x=  as a function of
1
1( )a x σ−+ . The cutoff draw for 1a  that changes the firm's 
decision from vertical FDI to domestic production is given by 1
pa . Note that 1 1
N pa a< , 
implying that there is a range of firms with a draw for manufacturing productivity that 
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can be improved upon via vertical investment but that still opt to produce domestically 
because the increase in profit is outweighed by the loss due to the increase in overhead. 
 
Figure 32 displays the productivity draw areas that choose the different production 
methods. 
 
 
Figure 32. Firms' choices as a function of their productivity draws 
 
Obviously the exact location of the various cutoffs depends on the chosen values, but the 
following qualitative results are general: 
 
 There will be a segment of firms that now enter production while they would 
have exited without the option to move production abroad. These firms are 
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characterized by high productivity in management and very low (initial) 
productivity in manufacturing. 
 
 There is a second segment of firms that switch from domestic production to 
vertical FDI. These firms also are characterized by high management and low 
manufacturing productivity. 
 
 Finally, there are firms that opt not to change their production process. These 
firms already have a high level of manufacturing productivity prior to receiving 
the option to move production abroad. 
 
In order to judge how well these result hold up under alternative specifications, I next 
examine the parallel case to Grossman et al. (2006), namely that firms that are 
previously good in manufacturing will continue to be good at it. The new productivity 
parameter will be proportional to the old one. 
 
5.2 Proportional rewards to Vertical FDI 
 
The assumption of factor price equalization across the world seems to take away the 
possibility of wage cost motivation behind Vertical FDI. However, due to the simple 
way that productivity is modeled, this specification with the 'rule' for the new 
productivity parameter 1 1
Na wa=  is in fact equivalent to one where the productivity 
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factor of the firm stayed the same, but it would have to pay lower wages for work done 
in the South. This is the framework introduced in Grossman et al. For comparison 
purposes, this particular case is analyzed in this section. 
 
Figure 33 shows the way that firms select themselves into the different groups with 
proportional rewards to Vertical FDI. 
 
 
Figure 33. Equilibrium entry and FDI decisions by firms with proportional rewards to Vertical FDI 
 
The dashed lines represent the boundaries of the regions corresponding to the three 
possible firm decisions. The solid lines show the way that the intersection and with it the 
value for *2a  is found and are given by 
[ ]11 2 DB a a fσ−+ =              (25) 
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and 
[ ]11 2 OB wa a fσ−+ =              (26) 
Clearly, the slope of the line for (25) in 1 2( , )a a - space is exactly one, whereas it is w<1 
for (26). Also, at 1 0a = , profits from domestic manufacturing are higher than those 
using vertical FDI by exactly O Df f− , which is positive by assumption. Given that both 
the intercept and the (absolute value of the) slope of the domestic manufacturing line is 
higher than for the vertical FDI line, the two lines must cross exactly once. At that point, 
firms are exactly indifferent between domestic and foreign manufacturing. Using the 
implicit function theorem we arrive at Proposition 1: 
 
Proposition 1: If ( ) 1DOffw σσ −< , the line describing all points at which firms are indifferent 
between vertical FDI and domestic production has a positive slope at the interception of 
() and (). 
Proof: In the appendix. 
 
So *2a  still represents a threshold management productivity level reaching or exceeding 
which is a necessary condition for a firm to consider vertical specialization if the 
advantage from moving manufacturing abroad is significant enough.25 
 
                                               
25
 Recall that a low w will mean a large decrease in marginal costs for a firm. Similarly, a value of Of  that 
is only slightly higher than Df  will result in many firms to choose vertical FDI. 
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While the details of the region boundaries in Figures 32 and 33 are different, the 
qualitative results remain similar to the more simplistic case of deterministic marginal 
cost awaiting firms that choose vertical FDI. One difference is that in this scenario, not 
every firm with a management draw of *2a  or lower will automatically enter production. 
Those who have fairly low initial manufacturing draws may still exit now, since the 
rewards from FDI are proportional. Note also that it is still true that there are some 'star' 
firms that choose not to use the option to move the manufacturing stage because the 
reduction in marginal cost is not worth the increase in overhead. This is a result that is 
contrary to previous findings in the literature. The reason is that firms are allowed to 
have different productivities in their two production stages in this paper, and vertical 
FDI only improves one of them. This model would generate the same predictions as 
Grossman et al. if firms were allowed to also move their management abroad and enjoy 
the lower marginal cost factor w. However, management has to remain in the home 
country and forms part of a firm's marginal costs in this model. Therefore, there will 
always be an initial level of manufacturing productivity which is high enough to get 
firms to stay and manufacture domestically. 
 
An important question is whether the mere introduction of the option to engage in FDI 
changes the values of cutoffs. Put in a different way - are there firms with management 
productivity below *2a  that entered the industry prior to closer economic integration but 
are now driven out? The next section deals with this question. 
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6 The Effects of Introducing the Option of Vertical FDI 
 
6.1 The Case of Two Management Productivity Levels 
 
In this section I examine the effects of moving from one equilibrium to the other. Since 
this paper focuses on the aspects of globalization that make it easier for firms to shift 
parts of their production processes abroad, I examine the changes caused by giving firms 
the option to engage in vertical FDI, which they formerly did not have. As a corollary to 
the results of opening up to trade documented by Melitz, high productivity firms 
generally "win", while low productivity firms that did produce without vertical FDI may 
now be driven out of the industry. 
 
In order to clarify the exposition and generate some analytical results, I return to the 
degenerate distribution for 1
Na  and also assume that there are only two levels of 
productivity in management in differentiated goods sector of the home economy, 2
La  and 
2
Ha . Note that low values represent low costs, so that 2
La  is the 'better' productivity draw. 
For comparison purposes, let us remember the equilibrium in this case in an economy 
without the vertical FDI option. There is a cutoff level for marginal cost *MC , and thus 
the 1a -cutoff level between production and exit for firms that have drawn 2
La  for 
management productivity is given by 
* *
1 2
L La MC a= −  
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Similarly, the cutoff for the low management productivity firms is 
* *
1 2
H Ha MC a= −  
Clearly, we have * *1 1
L Ha a> . There is also a demand factor that the firms take as given, 
[ ] 1RB P σσ ρ −≡ . The equilibrium conditions are 
( ) ( )* *1 1
1
*
1 2
1
*
1 2
1 1
1 1
1 2 1 1 2 12 20 0
( ) ( )
H L
H H
D
L L
D
a aH L
D D e
B a a f
B a a f
B a a f dG a B a a f dG a f
σ
σ
σ σ
−
−
− −
 + = 
 + = 
      + − + + − =         ∫ ∫
 
In the last condition we assume that the two draws for management productivity are 
equally probable. Given values for 2 2, , ,
L H
D ea a f f  and 1( )G a  this system of three 
equations can be solved for B, *1
Ha  and *1
La . 
 
Now we introduce the option to engage in vertical FDI. As we saw in Figure 32, firms 
that are productive enough to benefit from vertical FDI (in this scenario that is firms that 
draw 2
La ) will always enter production, the question is only whether they produce locally 
or abroad. For low productivity firms the question is still only between exit and entry. 
The conditions are now given by 
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( )
( ) ( )
( )
1
*
1
1
*
1 2
1 1
1 2 1 2
1 1
1
1 2 1 1 1 22 0
1
1
1 2 12 0
( ) (1 ( ))
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p
H
H H
D
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O D
a L p N L
e D O
a H
D
f B a a
f f B a a a a
f B a a f dG a G a B a a f
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σ σ
σ σ
σ
−
− −
− −
−
 = + 
   − = + − +   
    = + − + − + −     
  + + −   
∫
∫
 
Furthermore, we have the assumptions 
1
2( )H OB a fσ− <  
and 
1
1 2( )N L OB a a fσ−+ >  
These conditions lead directly to Proposition 2: 
 
Proposition 2: The introduction of the option to engage in vertical investment to move 
the manufacturing stage of production abroad results in a lower cutoff level *1Ha , 
meaning that the least productive firms are driven out. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Intuitively, expected profits ex-ante must stay the same since they are tied down by the 
fixed entry cost ef . Since drawing a high management productivity value now 
guarantees production, expected profits conditional on having drawn 2
La  increase and 
average productivity aɶ  does, as well. Thus it has to be the case that expected profits 
conditional on having drawn 2
Ha  decrease, and this is achieved by decreasing the cutoff 
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value and thus making it less likely for firms that have drawn 2
Ha  to enter production to 
begin with. Note that this also has a positive effect on aɶ , which therefore 
unambiguously rises compared to the old scenario. 
 
A corollary of Proposition one is that the new demand level B is lower than before 
introducing the option of vertical foreign investment. This can only be due to two 
possible factors, a decrease in nominal expenditure R or a decrease in the price level P. 
A decrease in P can be due to a decrease in the prices charged by individual firms or due 
to a decrease in the total number of firms entering. R in these models is set by the size of 
the economy, which has not changed. Thus it has to be the case that P has decreased. 
 
Proposition 3: The introduction of the vertical investment option results in every firm 
having the same or a higher total productivity level. 
Proof: For the firms drawing 2Ha  this follows directly from proposition one. For the 
firms drawing 2La , note that the firm that previously was the marginal firm with 
productivity levels *1 2( , )L old La a  now makes a loss, due to the drop in B. Therefore, it 
chooses to engage in vertical FDI. This proves that *1 1
p L olda a< . So every firm with a 
draw of 1pa  or higher will end up with manufacturing marginal cost of 1Na  due to 
production relocation, which is equivalent to an increase in productivity. Finally, high 
management productivity firms with productivity draws 1 1pa a<  will have the same 
marginal costs as without FDI. 
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Proposition 3 shows that each firm in the industry charges the same or a lower price than 
before. This leaves open the question of the total number of available varieties. Does the 
exodus of firms with low management productivity result in an overall decrease in 
available varieties, or is the increased number of firms with high management 
productivity, that can now stay in business because they are able to shift production 
abroad, enough to compensate or even exceed that number? 
Unfortunately, without further information regarding the distribution of productivity 
levels this question is impossible to answer. It reduces to the question whether 
* *
1 1( ) ( )H old H newG a G a− , which represents the mass of exiting firms, is greater than 
*
11 ( )L oldG a− , which represents the firms that are now able to enter. 
6.2 Continuous Support for Both Distributions and Productivity Levels 
 
The previous subsection analyzed the case of only two possible outcomes for the 
management productivity draw due to analytical tractability. In this subsection, I discuss 
what the likely consequences of relaxing this assumption would be. For that reason, I 
now assume that the support for the distribution of 2a  is given by 2(0, ]a . 
 
Recall that as soon as there is continuous support, there is also a cutoff level for 2a  
which splits the firms into those that engage in vertical FDI or domestic production and 
those that only choose between exiting and domestic production. 
1
1
*
2 1
NOfa a
B
σ− 
= − 
 
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Figure 34 shows the effect of introducing the option of vertical FDI on the domestic 
differentiated products sector: 
 
Figure 34. Production decision with and without vertical FDI 
 
In the initial equilibrium, firms with draws in the areas A and B will exit, all other firms 
enter the industry and produce. Introducing the productivity gains of vertical FDI will 
have different effects depending on whether the firm is above or below the management 
cutoff level *2a : For firms with productivity levels in the area C, the drop in the 
exogenous demand factor B results in negative profits, so that these firms are driven out. 
Firms in area D are firms that do not change, but for different reasons. Those that are 
above *2a  do not choose to engage in vertical FDI because it will not generate positive 
profits, independent of how much their manufacturing productivity might improve. The 
firms in area D below *2a  do not choose to engage in vertical FDI because the gains in 
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manufacturing productivity are not worth the increase in overhead costs. Clearly, an 
increase in the productivity level achieved by vertical FDI would shift the boundary 
between D and E to the left, at the same time as it would raise *2a  and shift the general 
cutoff line to the left due to the indirect effect on B. 
 
Finally, firms in area B are clearly the ones benefiting the most from the opportunity to 
move production abroad. They would not have been able to produce in the initial 
equilibrium due to too high manufacturing costs. Their high management productivity, 
however, ensures that they are able to take advantage of globalization by entering the 
industry and making positive profits. 
 
Summarizing, the rise of vertical FDI causes the overall demand factor B to fall, since 
differentiated products can now be produced at lower costs on average. This causes 
profits for all firms that do not move production abroad to fall. Firms in the area C in 
Figure 34 exit production. Firms in area E switch from domestic manufacturing to 
foreign based manufacturing, thereby raising their profits. Finally firms in area B raise 
their profits dramatically, because they have no prospects of entry without the possibly 
of production stage relocation. 
 
Note the difference to the basic result emphasized by Melitz: In his paper, 'opening up' 
the economy corresponds to firms gaining the opportunity to export. As a result, the 
more productive a firm is, the more it gains from trade. Here, it is not the firms that are 
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most productive overall that gain the most, but instead it is firms that are very productive 
in the management stage but initially have relatively high manufacturing costs, resulting 
in a large gain from moving the manufacturing stage abroad. 
 
6.3 Effects of a Continuing Process of Globalization 
 
Generally, global economic integration is not seen as occurring in discrete jumps, but 
rather as a gradual process. Thus it is of interest to examine the changes in Figure 34 that 
would occur if 'globalization'-related parameters were to continue changing. 
 
Given that the new draw for manufacturing productivity captures a host of different costs 
related to moving a production process abroad, we study the case of a decrease in 1
Na . 
Even though factor price equalization may be expected to erode labor cost differences 
over time, transportation and communication costs fall, as well, which makes the case 
that relocation of manufacturing processes becomes more attractive as globalization 
continues a plausible one. 
 
A drop in 1
Na  will cause more firms to shift their manufacturing abroad (see Figure 35). 
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Figure 35. Changes in firms' production decision 
 
Note that the firms in the triangular area above the (new) value for *2a  are left with 
relatively high marginal costs compared to the firms with higher management 
productivity, many of which now choose to move manufacturing abroad. This 
corresponds to high prices and thus to low output, so those firms will in general be rather 
small. So the model displays one of the obvious consequences of economic integration, 
which is to drive out smaller firms while generating opportunities for firms with high 
management productivity. The model shares this particular feature with the original 
model by Melitz. 
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Next we can also envision a reduction in Of , which corresponds to the costs of setting 
up a production site in a foreign country approaching the corresponding costs in the 
home country. Inspection of () reveals that a decrease in Of  will also move *2a  upwards, 
resulting in ceteris paribus more firms choosing to move manufacturing abroad. At the 
same time, the trade-off between domestic production and FDI for those firms below *2a  
will move to the left, so that the resulting change in the will be very similar to the one 
depicted in Figure 35. Note that the upwards movement of *2a  is limited by the 
simultaneous decrease in B due to the increase in overall average productivity. In other 
words, even with a 'high degree of globalization' we don't expect to see *2a  to be close to 
2a , meaning that most firms can engage in vertical FDI and produce. 
 
 Summarizing, a continuing process of globalization can be examined in this model via 
two different comparative statics exercises. As it turns out, both the reduction in 
overhead for production oversees and an increase in the productivity gains achieved via 
vertical FDI have similar effects. Small firms with low management productivity are 
driven out of production, while the number of firms that engage in vertical FDI 
increases. Eventually, firms that retain manufacturing in the home country will be 
characterized by very high productivity in both management and manufacturing - all 
other firms will have either exited or shifted the manufacturing stage. During this 
adjustment process, it is mainly firms that shift their manufacturing stages that grow 
(meaning their output and profits increase). Firms that retain domestic manufacturing, on 
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the other hand, see a decrease in profits due to the ever more competitive nature of the 
monopolistic competition and the subsequent decline in the demand factor B. 
 
By definition the model cannot address aspects of unemployment and changes in the 
composition of the workforce. There is only one production factor, so all kinds of labor 
are homogenous in this model. Also, employment is always full and is given 
exogenously by the size of the world (which is 2L). However, we can note that domestic 
firms that engage in vertical FDI will expand output and thus require more workers in 
the management sector. Also, employment in the homogenous goods sector in the 
foreign country decreases, which means that the domestic homogenous sector has to 
increase, in order to produce the same amount of goods globally (recall that the fractions 
of expenditure spent on the various types of goods are given by β and 1-β and are 
constant.) The implied change in the transition of the workforce in the home country is a 
flow from manufacturing jobs into management jobs but also into the homogenous 
goods sector. 
 
6.4 Relaxing the Assumption of a Degenerate Distribution of 1
Na  
 
Most parts of the analysis up to this point were facilitated by the assumption of vertical 
FDI having a known, deterministic benefit in form of a new and higher productivity 
measure for the manufacturing stage. A more realistic characterization would be another 
uncertain draw, with bad outcomes that could feasibly lead to exit of firms that have 
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made the decision to engage in vertical FDI. For this scenario to leave the qualitative 
results derived up to this point unchanged, we only need to make the following 
assumptions. The continued validity of the results hinges on ex-post average 
productivity of firms with a given management draw *2 2a a<  (where *2a  is now 
computed using 
1
*
1 2
N
OE B a a f
σ−  + =   
 being higher than the corresponding value in 
the economy without vertical FDI. But this has to hold, because only firms with a given 
management draw *2 2a a<  with 
1
1 2( )new N OB a a fσ−+ ≥  will stay in the industry after the 
FDI-draw. But since new oldB B<  and *1 2
old
DB a a f + =  , it has to be true that *1 1Na a< . 
This guarantees that in fact the ex-post average productivity levels for firms with 
management draw *2 2a a<  is higher than in the scenario without vertical FDI. 
 
The new conditions are given by: 
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The possibility of a bad draw introduces another way that the option of vertical FDI 
leads to increased exit by low productivity firms: While all firms below *2a  will choose 
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to engage in vertical FDI (because their expected profits cover the overhead Of ), firms 
whose level of management productivity is high are ex-ante more likely to stay in 
business after the realization of the FDI draw. This effect is similar to the one 
documented in the deterministic, proportional case in section 5.2. 
 
Overall, the main result remains: By causing an overall decrease in average marginal 
cost in the differentiated goods sector, the option to engage in vertical FDI and move 
manufacturing stages abroad leads to welfare gains. The exact channel through which 
welfare increases is the decline in the price index, while the amount of total nominal 
expenditure remains fixed at the level of the total labor force (of both countries 
combined, since foreign country consumers also consume differentiated goods). 
 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
The controversy surrounding firms that "move jobs abroad" is a very current and 
important one. As is the case with many aspects of globalization, economic theory 
comes down on the side which would not be popular in campaign stump speeches. This 
paper, in particular, presents an extension of Melitz' heterogeneous firms model that 
allows for two distinct production stages that are required to produce the final good. 
While trade is costless and the paper thus abstracts form the efficiency gains caused by 
inter-industry redistribution documented by Melitz, global economic integration is still 
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shown to lead to efficiency gains by allowing firms to move their production stages into 
the foreign country, which, while being costly, is assumed to lead to productivity gains 
at the firm level. 
 
Interestingly, the firms that benefit most from this kind of economic integration are not 
those with the lowest marginal costs ex-ante. Instead, it is firms that are very productive 
in executing the task that has to remain in the home country (assumed to be 
management) but initially not so productive in the manufacturing stage that experience 
the largest increases in profits. The details of these effects depend on various 
assumptions regarding the distributions of the productivity parameters and their potential 
correlation. However, as long as vertical investment is costly there will be firms in 
equilibrium that choose to manufacture domestically. As 'globalization' progresses, these 
firms will enjoy lower profits, because the overall decrease in production costs depresses 
the price level. At a late stage, only few, generally large, high manufacturing and 
management productivity firms will remain that still locate the manufacturing stage of 
production in the home country. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation addresses questions concerned with policy and globalization. It is 
shown that (the correct) government policy played an important role in the quick 
recovery of the UK economy from the recession in the early 1980s. The Business Cycle 
Accounting methodology allows the identification of the ‘wedge’ that accounts for most 
of the decline and recovery. I find the labor wedge to account for the lion’s share of the 
action, which suggests that labor market distortions were at the heart of problems in the 
UK. I interpret this as evidence suggesting that Margaret Thatcher’s policies that curbed 
the power of unions and reformed the wage negotiation process have helped the UK 
recover as quickly as it did. 
 
Taxes on labor income are also shown to be effective stabilization instruments under 
certain circumstances. In case of a large open economy that trades with another similarly 
large country, the prices of imported goods are important to welfare of domestic citizens. 
Therefore, spillovers from policy decisions abroad have to be taken into account, and the 
resulting optimal mix of stabilization policies includes fiscal stabilization via state-
contingent labor taxes. Optimal fiscal policy is shown to be counter-cyclical, in the sense 
that subsidies are raised in case of negative productivity shocks. 
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The openness of economies often results in suspicion and protectionist backlash. In 
particular, activities of firms that move production stages abroad are criticized – 
discussants often refer to this kind of vertical investment as “exporting job”. I show that 
there are some more facets to the story – in particular there is a range of firms that can 
only exist and produce because they have the option to move production stages away 
from the home country and thus lower their costs. This results in more varieties for the 
consumers and a lower price level in general. Both of these developments increase 
welfare and are at the same time often neglected in a discussion of the pros and cons of 
vertical foreign direct investment by firms.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Data Appendix for Chapter II: 
 
In order to arrive at the series for y, the following steps were taken: Nominal GNP for 
the UK was divided by the GNP deflator. The deflated amount of sales tax was 
subtracted and services and depreciation from consumer durables were added. The 
resulting value was divided by the working age population (age 15-64). All of the data is 
taken from OECD Outlook. The series for the stock of consumer durables is created 
using data on consumption of consumer durables and rates for depreciation and service 
flows, following CKM (2007). 
 
The series for x is the sum of gross fixed investment, private inventories, nominal net 
factor payments from abroad and personal consumption expenditure on durables. All of 
these summands are deflated and the product of sales tax and the share of consumer 
durables in total consumer spending is subtracted. Finally the value is divided by the 
working age population. Most of the data is taken from OECD Outlook; some is from 
G10 Economic and Financial Indicators, through Havers Analytics. 
 
The series for labor input is derived by multiplying annual hours worked per employed 
person with total employment and then dividing by working age population. The 
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resulting number is total hours worked in a year and is thus divided by the conceivable 
maximum, 50 weeks times 100 hours per week, 5000. 
 
Government consumption divided by working age population gives the series g. Finally, 
a series for the capital stock has to be created. Following the model, the Perpetual 
Inventory Method is used, starting with a value 0k  and using the law of motion, the 
calibrated parameter for depreciation and the budget constraint to arrive at all of the 
following values for k. Per capita consumption is by definition just the difference 
)( gxy +− .  
 
Proofs for Chapter IV: 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
The implicit function defining *1a  and 
*
2a  is given by 
[ ] [ ]1 11 2 1 2O DB wa a f B a a fσ σ− −+ − = + −  
The solution where both profit levels are exactly zero is known: 
1
1
* *
1 2( ) D
f
a a
B
σ− 
+ =  
 
 
1
1
* *
1 2( ) O
f
wa a
B
σ− 
+ =  
 
 
Using the Implicit Function Theorem we get 
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1 1 2 2
1 1
1 1
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1 2
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− + − − + 
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so for 1a  to fall as 2a  falls (which is what is required for Figure 33 to be reflecting the 
equilibrium) we require 
1
D
O
f
w f
σ
σ − 
<  
 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
By contradiction: Suppose the cutoff level stayed the same. Then B must also be the 
same. Then using () and () we get 
( )
( ) ( )
*
1
1
1
1
1 2 12 0
1 1
1
1 2 1 1 1 22 0
( )
( ) (1 ( ))
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p
a L
D
a L p N L
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−
− −
  + −   
    = + − + − + −     
∫
∫
 
or, using the fact that with unchanged B it must be the case that *1 1
L pa a>  
( ) ( )*1
1
1 1
1 2 1 1 1 2( ) (1 ( ))
L
p
a L p N L
D O
a
B a a f dG a G a B a a fσ σ− −   + − = − + −   ∫  
 
Close inspection reveals the contradiction: The integral on the left hand side must be 
smaller because we know that 
1
*
1 2 0
L L
DB a a f
σ−
 + − =   and 
1 1
1 2 1 2
p L N L
D OB a a f B a a f
σ σ− −
   + − = + −    . Now suppose the new cutoff level is higher, 
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* *
1 1
H new H olda a> . This implies that the demand factor must be higher, as well: new oldB B> . 
Again, using () and () we get 
( ) ( )
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An increase in B combined with an increase in the cutoff level results in 
( )( ) ( )* *1 11 11 2 1 1 2 10 0( ) ( ) ( )H old H newa aold H new HD DB a a f dG a B a a f dG aσ σ− −+ − < + −∫ ∫ . But then it 
must be true that  
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For the same reasons as in the previous case this forms a contradiction.  
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